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ARGUMENT 
I. IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO AFFIRM ON THE BASIS OF BOUNDARY 
BY AGREEMENT WHEREAS THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT AND THE IMUSES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
After thorough briefing of the issue by the parties at the trial level,1 the trial court 
specifically declined to address the issue of Boundary by Agreement. Nonetheless, on 
appeal the Imuses request that the Court confirm the trial court's decision on the alternate 
grounds of Boundary by Agreement. It would be inappropriate to affirm on these 
alternate grounds whereas there is a genuine issue of material fact and the Imuses are not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The doctrine of Boundary by Agreement is based 
on contract law and on contract principles and, therefore, the doctrine requires an 
agreement between the parties that is supported by consideration. See Carter v. Hanrath, 
885 P.2d 801, 805 n.5 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 925 P.2d 960 (Utah 
1996). Specifically, the doctrine of Boundary by Agreement requires: "(i) an agreement; 
(ii) between adjoining landowners; (iii) settling a boundary that was uncertain or in 
dispute; and (iv) executed by actual location of a boundary line. In addition, Utah 
requires mutual acquiescence for a long period of time." Stoker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 
417,423 n.4 (Utah 1990). In this case, the Imuses have not established the absence of a 
lIf it is so inclined, the Court may review the full memoranda filed by the Bahrs on the 
issue of Boundary by Agreement: Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 648-800); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Plaintiffs Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 490-579); Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1159-
1169). 
1 
genuine issue of material fact nor have they established that they are entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law under the doctrine of Boundary by Agreement. 
A. THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER 
THE PARTIES AGREED TO THE BOUNDARY LINE FOR A PERIOD OF 
20 YEARS. 
Although the Imuses argue at length that a period of acquiescence should not be 
required in order to establish a claim for Boundary by Agreement claims, the fact of the 
matter is Utah law requires mutual acquiescence for a long period of time. See id. More 
succinctly put is the following: 
It should be clearly understood that our case law does not support, and that 
we do not agree with the proposition that a landowner can claim boundary 
solely on the basis of an oral agreement. From a reading of the cases it will 
be seen that it requires the acceptance, or the giving of consent or approval, 
by words or conduct, over some substantial period of time and when certain 
requisites are met. This is true because it must be appreciated that 
recognition of such boundaries does have the effect of transferring 
ownership of disputed strips of property without compliance with the statute 
of frauds; and it may be at variance with recorded conveyances. 
Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 794 (Utah 1975). In determining what 
amount of time constitutes a "long period of time" the courts have been consistent in 
holding that at least 20 years is needed, absent unusual circumstances. See id. ("[Tjhere 
must be some substantial long period of time . . . [that is] generally related to the common 
law prescriptive period of 20 years; and only under unusual circumstances would a lesser 
period be deemed sufficient."). The Imuses maintain that the foregoing language of 
Hobson was an unfortunate consequence of the blurring of the doctrines of Boundary by 
Agreement and Boundary by Acquiescence and that, therefore, the Court should disregard 
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Hobson in as much as it requires "a long period of time" as an element of Boundary by 
Agreement. 
The Imuses' argument on this point is unpersuasive. There is substantial Utah 
authority requiring the acquiescence in a boundary line for a long period of time before 
the doctrine of Boundary by Agreement may be invoked. Stoker, 785 P.2d at 423 n.4; 
Hobson, 530 P.2d at 794; Jensen v. Bartlett, 286 P.2d 804 (Utah 1955); Glenn v. 
Whitney, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1949). Secondary authorities also confirm the 
requirement of mutual acquiescence for a long period of time as an element of Boundary 
by Agreement. See James H. Backman, The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries 
and the Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 957, 963 
(hereinafter "Backman") ("In addition to these requirements, many courts, including 
Utah, require mutual acceptance for a long period of time."); see also 10 Thompson on 
Real Property (Thomas Ed. 1994) 584, § 90.03(a)(2) ("Under proper circumstances, there 
may be a practical location of a doubtful boundary line by an agreement between 
adjoining owners, followed by acquiescence in the location made."); see also 12 Am. Jur. 
2d Boundaries § 72 ("The courts are divided in their opinions as to the necessity of 
continued acquiescence of both parties following the execution of the agreement. Some 
courts deny the necessity, but most of them directly or impliedly require such 
acquiescence.")(emphasis added). 
Applying these requirements to the facts of this case, at the very minimum there 
are factual disputes that remain. Even construing the facts in a light most favorable to the 
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Imuses, which is inappropriate for purposes of their motion, the existing fence was in 
place 20 years and a few months prior to their knowledge that Bahrs disagreed with the 
fence acting as the proper boundary line between their respective properties. The Bahrs, 
on the other hand have testified that they expressed doubt and concern to the Imuses 
about the boundary line throughout the years, which disagreement was made very clear in 
the spring and fall of 2002 due to an addition they made on their home and their builder's 
unequivocal conclusion that the fence was on Bahrs' property. (R at 748-749, pgs. 
15:23-18:12; see also R at 749, pg. 21:10-25; R at 751, pgs. 26:19-27:5; R at 752, pgs. 
31:24-32:21; R at 753, pgs. 34:20-35:11; R at 754, pg. 41:8-13; R at 755, pgs. 44:7-45:22; 
R at 756, pgs. 46:7-49:15; R at 757, pgs. 50:14-51:17; R at 758, pgs. 55:19-57:7; R at 
758-759, pgs. 57:20-59:21; R at 776-777, pgs. 129:24-130:4; and see also R at 728, pgs. 
16:23-17:9; R at 729, pgs. 20:6-21:5; R at 730, pgs. 22:5-23:3; R at 733, pgs. 34:20-24; R 
at 741, pg. 66:9-20; R at 742, pgs. 70:2-71:2; mdsee also R at 782-783, pgs. 13:7-15:6; 
R at 784, pgs. 18:19-19:1.) In short, at a minimum, construing all the facts and their 
reasonable inferences in Bahrs' favor, there is a factual dispute as to whether or not there 
was mutual acquiescence for a sufficiently long period of time in relation to the fence. 
B. IMUSES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WHEREAS THE BOUNDARY LINE WAS NOT UNCERTAIN OR IN 
DISPUTE. 
Imuses have failed to set forth evidence that the boundary line was uncertain or in 
dispute at the time that the fence was built. The boundary between adjoining properties 
must be uncertain or in dispute for a parole agreement fixing the boundary between such 
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properties to overcome Statute of Frauds concerns. Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P. 912, 916 
(Utah 1928); see also Stoker, 785 P.2d at 423. A boundary is uncertain or in dispute only 
where there is "some objectively measurable circumstance in the record title or in the 
reasonably available survey information . . . that would have prevented a landowner, as a 
practical matter, from being reasonably certain about the true location of the boundary." 
Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500, 505 (Utah 1984) {overruled on other grounds by Staker, 
785 P.2d at 424); see also Jensen, supra, (uncertainty found due to lack of markers and 
plat map); see also Glenn, 209 P.2d at 260. 
The Imuses suggest that the issue of uncertainty regarding the doctrine of 
Boundary by Agreement is unsettled in Utah. The Imuses' argument ignores Utah case 
law and the relationship between the doctrines concerning the issue of uncertainty. The 
Imuses' argument also assumes that an objective uncertainty standard is a novel concept 
in the arena of Boundary by Agreement. These boundary doctrines did not develop 
separately in a vacuum; rather, the doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence was formed as 
a supplement to the doctrine of Boundary by Agreement. See Boundaries by Agreement 
and Acquiescence in Utah, 1975 Utah L.Rev. 221, 224 ("Boundary by acquiescence was 
originally an extension of boundary by agreement. The doctrine applied in cases where 
although neighboring owners had recognized a boundary line for a long period of time, 
they could not show that they had ever agreed on the boundary's location."). 
It follows that the doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence borrows its requirements 
from the doctrine of Boundary by Agreement. The element of uncertainty has always 
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been a prerequisite of Boundary by Agreement, otherwise any parole agreement fixing 
the boundary between adjoining properties would fail for lack of consideration or due to 
the statute of frauds. Backman at 966-967. ("Since the doctrine is based on contract law, 
the agreement can be defeated if there is a failure of consideration. If actual knowledge 
of the boundary situation exists, the consideration of the party gaining the land fails 
because he exchanged nothing, not even a nagging uncertainty, to establish the boundary. 
Therefore, uncertainty or dispute is a necessary element of boundary by agreement.") To 
the extent that Boundary by Acquiescence has ever required the element of uncertainly, 
the doctrine has adopted that element from Boundary by Agreement. See 7 ALR 4th 53, 
59 (1981) ("Since dispute or uncertainty is a prerequisite for application of the doctrine of 
boundary by agreement, the intermingling of the two doctrines has led some jurisdictions 
to also require dispute or uncertainty for application of the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence."). It stands to reason, therefore, that any pronouncement by the Court as to 
the meaning of dispute and uncertainty should apply to the Boundary by Agreement. See 
Backman at 973 ("Now, however, Utah courts require an objective showing that the 
implied agreement grew out of a dispute or uncertainty as to the proper location of the 
boundary. The claimants probably would be unable to carry this burden of proof. They 
would in essence have to establish the same factors that are required in a boundary by 
agreement case, which more than likely would be impossible.") (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the Imuses' assertions, Utah authority requires that uncertainty be 
measured by an objective standard in a Boundary by Agreement case. Glenn, 209 P.2d at 
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260. Id. In Glenn, the Court determined that: 
If it was not clear before the case of Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 
57, 276 P. 912, 69 A. L. R. 1417, it was expressly recognized 
there and in all Utah cases in point handed down subsequent 
to it, see Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 
141 P. 2d 160; and Smith v. Nelson, 114 Utah 51, 197 P. 2d 
132, that there must be some uncertainty or a dispute between 
adjoining owners as to the location of the true boundary line 
before a fence which they subsequently erect to resolve their 
differences and in which they acquiesce for a long period of 
time, may be taken as the agreed boundary line. Using the 
terms "uncertainty" and "dispute" loosely, we might say that 
the parties here were uncertain as to the location of the 
boundary line inasmuch as neither of them had attempted to 
locate it prior to the survey made by plaintiff. This, however, 
is not "uncertainty" as this term was meant to be used. 
Id. The Court continued that "lack of knowledge as to the location of the true boundary is 
not synonymous with uncertainty." Id. Furthermore, contrary to the Imuses' position, the 
Halladay Court relied on Glenn, a Boundary By Agreement case, in its analysis of 
whether or not uncertainty in general should be measured by an objective or subjective 
standard. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 504. In fact, the Halladay Court affirmatively reinstated 
the Court's holding in Glenn. Id. at 505 ("After carefully considering our previous 
decisions on this question, we return to the more rigorous definition set forth in Glenn v. 
Whitney, supra, and hold that "dispute" is not proved by a mere difference of opinion, and 
"uncertainty" is not proved by a mere lack of actual knowledge of the true location of the 
boundary.") Therefore, the definition of uncertainty set forth in Halladay applied to both 
Boundary by Agreement and Boundary by Acquiescence cases. 
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Contrary to Defendants' arguments, Staker did not rule that uncertainty should be 
measured by a subjective standard. See generally Staker, 785 P.2d at 417. The word 
"subjective" does not even appear in Staker. Id. Neither did Staker set forth a definition 
of uncertainty. Id. Staker did not disturb the Holladay Court's definition of uncertainty; 
rather, Staker merely ruled that there was no "fifth requirement" of Boundary by 
Acquiescence cases. Id. at 424. 
While Staker overruled Holladay, the holding in Staker is limited. Holladay 
addressed two issues: (i) whether uncertainty was an element of Boundary by 
Acquiescence; and (ii) whether the uncertainty requirement would be evaluated under a 
subjective or objective standard. Holladay, 685 P.2dat501. The Holladay Court 
concluded that, although there had been a great deal of confusion concerning the 
uncertainty requirement, the weight of authority established that uncertainty was indeed 
an element of Boundary by Acquiescence, thus creating a fifth element for the doctrine.2 
Id. at 504. The Holladay Court then evaluated the meaning of the uncertainty 
requirement in light of both the doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence and Boundary By 
Agreement. See id. at 504-505. The Court determined that the uncertainty requirement, 
under either doctrine, must be evaluated by an objective standard. See id. at 505. 
The issue before the Court in Staker was whether or not the fifth requirement of 
2
 The first four elements being: (i) occupation of the disputed property up to a visible 
monument; (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (iii) for a period of twenty years; 
and (iv) by adjoining landowners. Carter v. Hanrath, 925 P.2d 960, 961-962 (Utah 1996). 
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uncertainty should be eliminated from Boundary by Acquiescence claims. Staker, 785 
P.2d at 424. The Staker Court ruled that the uncertainty requirement effectively rendered 
the doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence lifeless and, consequently, the Court 
eliminated the uncertainty requirement related to the doctrine of Boundary by 
Acquiescence. Id. at 423-424. The Court's holding in Staker, however, is limited to the 
doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence and does not apply to the doctrine of Boundary by 
Agreement. See id. at 418; 422-423 ("We affirm the judgment and overrule Halladay v. 
Guff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984), and its progeny as to the 'objective uncertainty' 
requirement in boundary by acquiescence") (emphasis added). The Court's holding in 
Staker, therefore, does not disturb the Halladay Court's holding that uncertainty, as it 
relates to the doctrine of Boundary by Agreement, is evaluated by an objective standard. 
Moreover, Justice Howe's dissenting opinion in Halladay, upon which Staker was 
based, addressed mainly that "uncertainty" had never been required in Boundary by 
Acquiescence cases and that requiring "uncertainty" would not be compatible with the 
doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 511 (stating that the 
requirement of "uncertainty or dispute... would be entirely foreign to the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence because the basis of the doctrine is that the law implies that 
there once existed uncertainty and dispute and that the adjoining owners mutually agreed 
upon the marked boundary in settlement.") (no emphasis added). Justice Howe's dissent 
does not attack the objective standard adopted by the Court; rather, he maintains that 
uncertainty is not a necessary or workable element of Boundary by Acquiescence. Id. 
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Utah's objective standard is in harmony with the approaches adopted by other 
jurisdictions and the statements made by secondary sources. The objective standard is the 
better approach, found in the better reasoned opinions in other jurisdictions. In making its 
determination on the issue of uncertainty, the Halladay Court relied on Buza v. 
Wojtalewicz, 180 N.W.2d 556, 560-561 (Wis. 1970); Hartung v. Witte, 18N.W. 175, 
180-181 (Wis. 1884); Fry v. Smith, 430 P.2d 486,487-488 (Idaho 1967). Still other 
Court have employed the same reasoning in employing an objective standard to the 
element of uncertainty. Carstensen v. Brown, 236 P. 517 (Wyo. 1925) ("doctrine 
inapplicable where boundary line "could have been easily ascertained."); Shaw v. 
Williams, 50 So.2d 125, 128 (Fla. 1950) (objective uncertainty required for 
acquiescence); Lisher v. Krasselt, 492 P.2d 52, 53-55 (Idaho 1972) (no uncertainty 
existed where parties did not want to get a survey); Bryant v. Blevins, 884 P.2d 1034 (Cal. 
1994) (objective uncertainty required for boundary by agreement). 
The reasoning employed by the Court it Bryant is particularly instructive. In that 
case the Supreme Court of California observed that the historical justifications for the 
doctrine of Boundary by Agreement are not as compelling in modem times and cautioned 
against an expansive application of the doctrine where a legal description of the true 
boundary exists. Bryant v. Blevins, 884 P.2d at 1040. The Court observed in that case 
that "[t]he doctrine of agreed boundaries arose as a means to settle disputes over 
boundaries at a time when surveys were notoriously inaccurate and the monuments and 
landmarks they described often could not be found in later years . . . . Given the 
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difficulties of fixing boundaries according to the old surveys, courts properly recognized 
boundary lines which had served for lengthy periods of time as a practical boundary." Id. 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court further noted that "[i]n more recent 
times, however, accurate surveys are possible and verifiable recorded deeds are the rule.... 
to allow the doctrine of agreed boundaries to supersede recorded legal descriptions of the 
property where, as here, they are fully consistent, would not only destroy the significance 
of recorded instruments but would foster litigation rather than preventing it." Id. 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Finally, the Court stated that "[w]hile the 
doctrine of agreed boundaries has never been intended to be a means of divesting an 
unconsenting landowner of his property, this is precisely its effect when used to overcome 
long-standing accurate legal descriptions of property." Id. (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
Utah's objective standard likewise comports with the majority view, as reported in 
secondary sources, and likewise comports with the view of commentators. 12 Am. Jur. 
2d Boundaries § 74 ("If, however, the parties undertake by parole agreement to fix the 
location of a boundary line under the belief that they are fixing the true boundary line, 
when, in fact, it is not, their agreement is not binding and may be set aside by either party 
upon the discovery of the mistake."); see also 10 Thompson on Real Property (Thomas 
Ed. 1994) 586-587, § 90.03(a)(2) ("If the agreement is based on an honest mistake, it is 
not binding upon the parties. An agreement or acquiescence in a wrong boundary when 
the deed gave the true lines or they were known is treated as a mistake and is not binding 
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upon the parties.... It is only where the true line is unknown or is difficult to ascertain, 
and the parties by agreement establish the line to settle a disputed and vexatious question 
as to the boundary line between them, that the parties are bound.") (emphasis added). 
Utah courts have vacillated back and forth as to the standard of uncertainty in 
boundary disputes. Early cases adopted an objective standard of uncertainty. Glenn, 209 
P.2d at 260; see also Note, 1975 Utah L.Rev., supra, at 231-32. The Court seemingly 
overruled itself in Ekberg, adopting a subjective standard. Ekberg v. Bates, 239 P.2d 205, 
207 (Utah 1951). Shortly thereafter, the Court then employed an objective standard. 
Jensen, 286 P.2d at 805 (Where there was no evidence as to the identities of the persons 
who constructed the fence or the purpose for which it was constructed, the Court found 
that the uncertainty requirement had been established due to objective difficulties in 
ascertaining the true boundary line). Several years thereafter, the objective standard was 
unequivocally adopted by the Halladay Court. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 505 {overruled on 
other grounds by Stoker, 785 P.2d at 424). The Imuses now ask the Court to overrule 
itself yet again and return to the subjective standard used for a period in the mid 20th 
Century. If this Court were to address the "unfortunate problems" of the Imuses by 
turning from the principles of stare decisis, the Court would be falling in the trap foresaw 
by Justice Howe in his dissent from the Court's decision in Stoker. Justice Howe 
cautioned the Court at that time to adhere to stare decisis, stating: 
Certainly "unfortunate problems" may appear to exist in cases 
which come before us. But "problematic cases" persuaded us 
in the first instance to apply the established criteria. And 
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"solving" perceived problems in this case may only serve to 
create other concerns in cases pending or in situations where 
other parties have relied upon the established precedent. 
There will always exist cases which might be labeled "unfair," 
where justices may individually wish that the law were 
otherwise. However, to allow such a case to precipitate 
premature decision making will only result in bad law and is 
to turn the Court's processes into nothing more than emotional 
reflexing. Until such time as the issue is adequately before us 
and the Court has been properly briefed and counseled from 
both prospectives as to the benefits and detriments of 
discarding our established doctrine and precedent, in short, 
until the case demands it, justice would be better served by 
following the principles of stare decisis and refraining from 
addressing the objective uncertainty issue here. 
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d at 426 (Justice Howe dissenting). 
In the present matter, there is no dispute that the titles to the adjoining properties 
provide an adequate description of the true boundary between the properties. Both the 
Bahrs and the Imuses have procured surveys, which were based upon the descriptions on 
the titles to the properties. See Peterson Engineering Survey (R at 794.); see also Bush & 
Gudgell, Inc. Survey (R at 796.) Both surveys show that the fence in question is located 
on the Bahrs' property. (R at 794; R at 796.) Consequently, there is no dispute as to 
whether an objectively measurable defect in the recorded title of the properties would 
have prevented the parties from being reasonably certain about the true location of the 
boundary. The Imuses5 and Bahrs' predecessors in interest simply failed to procure a 
survey, but such neglect does not rise to the level of "objective uncertainty." Therefore, 
the Imuses have failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that the boundary 
was uncertain at the time of the alleged agreement between the Bahrs' predecessors in 
title. 
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CONCLUSION 
It would not be appropriate to affirm the ruling of the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals on the basis of Boundary by Agreement whereas there is a genuine dispute of 
material facts and the Imuses are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. First, there 
is a dispute as to whether the parties acquiesced to the boundary line for the required 20-
year period. Second, the true boundary line in this matter was never uncertain or in 
dispute because boundary was readily ascertainable based on the recorded deeds and 
property descriptions. Accordingly, the trial court and the Court of Appeals should be 
reversed. 
lis DATED this ^ day of April, 2010. 
KELLY & BRAMWELL, P.C. 
I 
Steven M. Kelly 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries 
and the Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy 
James H. Backman* 
In recent decisions, the Utah Supreme Court has overturned 
a long-established approach for settling boundary disputes.1 The 
court has placed significant restrictions on traditional means of 
settling disputes between neighbors regarding the practical loca-
tion of boundaries. Understanding the full impact of the recent 
Utah decisions requires familiarity with Utah law on adverse 
possession2 and with boundary dispute doctrines used in other 
jurisdictions.3 Several commentaries have already explored the 
specific decisions,4 beginning with Halladay v. Cluff* in which 
the Utah court has developed its new position. This article as-
sesses these decisions in a larger context and proposes legisla-
tion6 to revamp Utah's statute of limitations, making adverse 
possession the normal means of resolving most boundary 
disputes. 
1 LEGAL DOCTRINES 
Courts have employed several major doctrines to award 
property to a party in possession despite superior record title in 
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. A.B., 
1969, Harvard College; J.D., 1972, University of Utah. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research assistance of Richard van't Rood in the preparation of this article. 
1. See Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984); Stratford v. Morgan, 689 
P.2d 360 (Utah 1984); Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-12 (1953). 
3. See Browder, The Practical Location of Boundaries, 56 MICH. L. REV. 487 (1958); 
Comment, Built-up Boundaries Outweigh Paper Boundaries, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 293 (1916) 
[hereinafter Comment, Built-up Boundaries]; Comment, Agreed Boundaries and 
Boundaries by Acquiescence: The Need for a Straight Line from the Courts, 9 LOY. 
L.AL. REV. 637 (1976). 
4. Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 131, 193; Note, Halladay 
v. Cluff: "Objective Uncertainty" In Deed!, 11 J. CONTEMP. LAW 567 (1985) [hereinafter 
Note, In Deed!]; Note, Objective Uncertainty in Boundary by Acquiescence: Halladay v. 
Cluff, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REV. 71L 
5. 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 112-14. 
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another person.7 These doctrines are: (1) long-term adverse pos-
session; (2) short-term adverse possession; (3) prescriptive ease-
ment; and (4) boundary dispute doctrines, including boundary 
by agreement, acquisition, and estoppel All of these doctrines 
are related, though their requirements differ. 
A. Adverse Possession 
Adverse possession, sometimes known as title by prescrip-
tion, transfers interests in land to a person in possession without 
the consent of the legal owner.8 The doctrine originated in thir-
teenth century England and by 1623 evolved into the prototype 
for American statutes.9 The English statute was essentially a 
statute of limitations which limited the time in which a person 
with legal title could bring an action to regain possession from 
one in wrongful possession.10 The English rule was adopted by 
most early American jurisdictions and still prevails today. 
American scholars characterize the doctrine of adverse pos-
session as a method of taking title to another's property through 
a "wrongful" occupation.11 There are varying explanations for 
the rule, but most courts agree on its basic rationale. Justice 
Holmes aptly stated: "The true explanation of title by [adverse 
possession] seems to me to be that man, like a tree in the cleft of 
a rock, gradually shapes his roots to his surroundings, and when 
the roots have grown to a certain size, can't be displaced without 
cutting at his life."12 Although his possession is said to be wrong-
ful, the claimant seldom deliberately sets out to take land from 
another by claiming adverse possession.13 Most people, in fact, 
settle into a piece of land believing that the land belongs to 
them. The doctrine has therefore been accepted as additional ti-
tle assurance for one who possesses land under a belief of 
ownership.14 
7. See generally R CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROP-
ERTY § 11.8, at 764-65 (1984) [hereinafter R CUNNINGHAM]. 
8. See R POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY If 1012, at 1087 (abr. ed. 
1968) [hereinafter R POWELL]. 
9. See id. at 1087-88. 
10. Id. at 1088. 
11. See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.6, at 757. 
12. M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OP JUSTICE HOLMES 417-18 (1943) (quoting 
letter from Justice Holmes to William James (Apr. 1, 1907)). 
13. J. CRIBBET & C. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 1554 (5th ed. 
1984). 
14. See Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135-37 
(1918). 
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However, because adverse possession is a judicial doctrine 
governed by state statutes, the requirements differ from state to 
state. Two types of adverse possession exist in the United States 
today, "long-term" and "short-term/' 
To satisfy the elements of long-term adverse possession,15 
one must have (1) actual, (2) open and notorious, (3) hostile, (4) 
exclusive, and (5) continuous possession of the land for the stat-
utory period, usually about twenty years.16 The first element, ac-
tual possession, requires some physical occupation of the land. 
This may be satisfied by such possessory acts as building fences, 
roads, or buildings,17 which define the boundaries of the land 
taken. Some courts relax the actual possession element, requir-
ing only constructive possession, when the claimant holds a doc-
ument that gives "color of title"18—the appearance of title to the 
land claimed. Under this exception to the actual possession rule, 
the description in the document, rather than the possessory acts, 
set the boundaries.19 
Open and notorious possession requires that there be visible 
15. Forty-one states have this type of adverse possession. Pendley v. Pendley, 338 
So. 2d 405, 406-07 (Ala. 1976); ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12-526 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-101 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-101 (1982); 
Ruggiero v. Town of East Hartford, 2 Conn. App. 89, 477 A.2d 668, 672-73 (1984); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit 10, § 7902 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.12 (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 
44-5-163 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-31 (1976); III . ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-101 
(Smith-Hurd 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (West 1950 & Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-503 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.010 (Baldwin 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
14, § 801 (1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-103 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 260, § 21 (West 1959); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5801 (Callaghan 1986); Miss. CODE 
ANN. § 15-1-13 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.010 (Vernon 1952); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-202 
(1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:2 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-30 (West Supp. 
1986); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501 (McKinney 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-40 (1983); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-04 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.04 (Baldwin 1981); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 93 (West 1960 & Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.050 (1983); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 71 (Purdon 1970); R.L GEN. LAWS § 34-7-1 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 15-67-210 (Law. Co-op. 1977); SX>. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-3-3 (1984); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 28-2-101 (1980); Tx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.026 (Vernon 1987); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 501 (1973); VA. CODE § 8.01-236 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7-28-
050 (1961); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-1 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.25 (West 1983); WYO. 
STAT. § 1-3-103 (1977). 
16. R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.7, at 758. 
17. See id. 
18. Through the color of title exception, a person can increase the amount of land 
"possessed" by adverse possession because the description in the document giving color 
of title may include more land than is actually possessed. Lott v. Muldoon Rd. Baptist 
Church, 466 P.2d 815, 817-18 (Alaska 1970); Nyman v. City of Eugene, 286 Or. 47, 64, 
593 P.2d 515, 524 (1979). 
19. Lott, 466 P.2d at 817-18. 
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evidence of the use of the land. Actual possession usually satis-
fies this element perforce; it is a more difficult (and particularly 
important) element in the case of constructive possession. This 
element, sometimes called the "notice" requirement, is consid-
ered crucial because it provides the legal owner with notice of 
the claimant's intention and thus with the opportunity to take 
preventive measures against the possessor.20 
The third element, hostility, means in most states that the 
possession cannot be with the owner's permission.21 Therefore, 
any use with permission such as a license or lease will not qual-
ify as adverse possession. Some courts add to the lack-of-permis-
sion requirement by requiring specially that the possession be 
under a claim of right.22 Claim of right may be difficult to estab-
lish because many courts do not have a clear definition of the 
concept. 
The exclusive-possession element demands that the owner 
and the adverse possessor never had concurrent ownership.23 
This requirement solidifies the adverse possessor's claim of con-
tinuous possession and evidences an intent to exercise dominion 
over the land to the exclusion of all others. 
Under the last element of adverse possession, continuity, 
the possessor cannot allow any significant interruptions of his 
possession before the statutory period runs. What constitutes a 
significant interruption depends on the nature of the land.24 If 
an adverse possessor transfers his interest to another before the 
period of limitations has run, "tacking" allows the new possessor 
to add the time of his possession to that of his predecessor and 
use the aggregate to satisfy the statutory period.25 To success-
fully invoke tacking, there must be privity between transferor 
and transferee, and the transfer must be made with a document 
showing color of title.26 
The second form of adverse possession, short-term adverse 
possession, has much the same requirements as long-term ad-
20. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982); R. POWELL, supra note 8,111013. 
21. Penn v. Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1980); R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.7, 
at 760. 
22. R. POWELL, supra note 8, H 1015, at 1091. 
23. Raftopoulos v. Monger, 656 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Colo. 1983); Dzuris v. Kucharik, 
164 Colo. 278, 282, 434 P.2d 414, 416 (1967); see R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.7, at 
762. 
24. R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.7, at 763. 
25. See R. POWELL, supra note 8,1 1021. 
26. See generally Warren, A Problem in "Tacking," 88 U. PA. L. REV. 897 (1940). 
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verse possession, with the differences of a shortened limitation 
period and the special requirement that the adverse possessor 
either pay the property taxes before the legal owner,27 or base 
his claim on a document (which boosts the claim to one made 
under color of title).28 If the possessor pays the taxes or has 
color of title and satisfies all the requirements of long-term ad-
verse possession for a shorter statutory period—usually five to 
seven years—he receives title to the land. 
Short-term adverse possession was probably created as an 
incentive to pay taxes.29 But it also creates an incentive to take 
land by adverse possession. Because one must procure a tax 
description from the assessor's office in order to pay land taxes, 
one is likely to become aware that he is not the legal owner of 
land he possesses. One who thus learns that he is on land to 
which he has no legal title may deliberately try to take it 
through short-term adverse possession.30 
One who possesses land for a long period without having le-
gal title, but believing he is the actual owner, is unlikely to think 
of procuring a tax description in order to pay taxes on the 
land.31 The tract that he wrongfully possesses will probably lie 
next to his own, and he will think that he is already paying taxes 
on it. Consequently, such a person rarely takes land by short-
term adverse possession. Furthermore, boundaries between 
properties are probably seldom settled under the short-term ad-
verse possession requirement of paying taxes. Therefore, the ra-
27. See Montgomery, The Adverse Possession of Land Titles in Utah, 3 UTAH L. 
REV. 294, 310 (1953). Currently, nine states have shortened statutes of limitations for 
cases where taxes are paid, in addition to their long-term statutes. ALA. CODE § 6-5-200 
(1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-525 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-102 (1962) (posses-
sion not required); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-108 (1982); III. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 
13-107, -109 (Smith-Hurd 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-3-15 (1984); TEX. Crv. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.025 (Vernon 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.28.070 
(1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.27 (West 1983). 
28. States which have shortened statutes of limitations for cases involving color of 
title include the following: ALA. CODE § 6-5-200 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.050 (1983); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-523 (1982); and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38 (1983). Some states 
require color of title for longer adverse possession also. See, e.g., N J). CENT. CODE § 28-
01-08 (1974). 
29. See Montgomery, supra note 27, at 313. 
30. A few states allow shortened statutes of limitations for color of title claims. See 
supra note 28. These statutes also require affirmative action by the possessor, thus 
preventing anyone from adversely possessing land not included in his deed description 
but within his physical boundary. 
31. See Herrmann v. Woodeil, 107 Idaho 916, 919-20,693 P.2d 1118,1121-22 (1985); 
Piatt v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 323, 324, 563 P.2d 586, 587 (1977). 
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tionale behind long-term adverse possession of providing addi-
tional title assurance does not apply to short-term adverse 
possession. 
Utah is one of the few states that does not have long-term 
adverse possession,32 though it does have short-term adverse 
possession. However, since short-term adverse possession does 
not help resolve boundary disputes, Utah property owners must 
look to other methods of resolving such disputes and providing 
better title assurance. 
B. Prescriptive Easements 
The doctrine of prescriptive easements is another method 
whereby one can obtain rights to the land of another without the 
owner's permission.33 The prescriptive easement is a judicial 
doctrine based on the statute of limitations. It was created at 
about the same time as adverse possession and operates in much 
the same manner.34 The requirements for a prescriptive ease-
ment also resemble those of adverse possession. One can obtain 
a prescriptive easement by showing that a particular use of land 
has been "open and notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, ad-
verse, and under claim of right."35 
A crucial difference between the doctrines of adverse pos-
session and prescriptive easement is that the former gives title 
to land while the latter confers only a right to use it in a specific 
way.36 Therefore, the doctrine will not serve to settle boundary 
disputes as does long-term adverse possession.37 The prescrip-
tive easement does, however, serve to settle disputes over the 
use of land. 
C. Boundary Dispute Doctrines 
Boundary dispute doctrines38 were created to resolve recur-
32. See supra note 15. 
33. See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 8.7; R. POWELL, supra note 8,1 413. 
34. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
35. J. DUKEMINER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 994 (1981); see also supra note 8 and 
accompanying text 
36. R. POWELL, supra note 8, H 413, at 555. 
37. Another reason why the doctrine of prescriptive easements is insufficient for set-
tling boundary disputes is that a disputed tract will rarely be used for a specific purpose 
for the prescribed length of time. In most cases, the use of a disputed tract is construed 
as possession rather than a use and therefore does not qualify for a prescriptive ease-
ment. See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 8.7, at 452. 
38. See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.8. 
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ring problems encountered in trying to fix boundaries between 
adjoining property owners. Adjoining landowners often suffer 
from incorrectly marked boundaries or unclear deed descrip-
tions. Three separate doctrines have been developed to resolve 
such questions. These include: (1) boundary by agreement, (2) 
boundary by acquiescence, and (3) estoppel.39 All of these prin-
ciples share similar policy foundations which are to promote effi-
cient use of property, to reduce litigation, to establish a status of 
repose, to remove stale claims, and to avoid the necessity of pro-
ducing evidence of events from the distant past.40 
1. Boundary by agreement 
The theoretical bases of boundary by agreement and bound-
ary by acquiescence are similar but not identical. The differ-
ences are important in defining the elements of each of these 
boundary resolution rules. Boundary by agreement is premised 
on a contractual theory,41 whereas boundary by acquiescence, 
though it has some of the same elements, is founded on public 
policy considerations similar to the justifications for adverse 
possession.42 
The elements of an enforceable boundary by agreement are 
(1) an agreement (2) between adjoining landowners, (3) settling 
a boundary that was uncertain or in dispute, and (4) executed 
by actual location of a boundary line.43 In addition to these re-
quirements, many courts, including Utah,44 require mutual ac-
ceptance for a long period of time, typically the same length of 
time required for long-term adverse possession.45 As commenta-
tors have pointed out,46 the stated requirement that the bound-
ary set by agreement must have existed for a long period of time 
effectively removes a major distinction between boundary by 
agreement and boundary by acquiescence. In theory at least, 
39. See generally Browder, supra note 3. This article remains the best exploration 
of these boundary doctrines. 
40. See, e.g., Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979). 
41. See Comment, Built-up Boundaries, supra note 3, at 293-96. 
42. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 P.2d 145,147 (1973). 
43. Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 24, 232 P.2d 202, 206 (1951); R CUNNINGHAM, 
supra note 7, § 11.8, at 766-68; Browder, supra note 3, at 490-95; Note, Boundaries by 
Agreement and Acquiescence in Utah, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 221, 221. 
44. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 794 (Utah 1975). 
45. R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.8, at 767. 
46. Note, supra note 43, at 222-23. 
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there should be no general time requirement in boundary by 
agreement. 
The boundary by agreement doctrine requires that the 
boundary agreement be in writing to comply with the Statute of 
Frauds because it involves the transfer of title to land.47 To the 
degree the boundary is set on a line that differs from the record-
title line, one of the parties gains title to an additional parcel of 
land at the expense of the other. Yet most boundary-by-agree-
ment situations involve only an oral understanding. To preserve 
oral agreements, some courts have indulged in the fiction that, 
because there is uncertainty, the agreement merely defines the 
actual boundary rather than transferring land from one party to 
another/8 Professor Browder justifies this fiction by arguing that 
boundary agreements are essentially in a unique category in 
which public policy should support a deviation from traditional 
contractual rules such as the Statute of Frauds. Courts, he indi-
cates, have appropriately argued that boundary agreements are 
akin to arbitration agreements and are therefore not subject to 
the Statute of Frauds.49 
Another contractual requirement—that the agreement be 
supported by consideration—is satisfied by the dispute-or-un-
certainty requirement. Each party by agreeing on a boundary 
surrenders its right to assert its position in a more formal con-
text. The compromise position reached "does not create new 
rights, but only establishes existing ones."60 
The legal difficulties associated with boundary by agree-
ment are troubling, but seldom defeat the doctrine's application. 
The major obstacle is providing sufficient evidence to prove 
boundary by agreement.51 As mentioned above, most agreements 
made to settle boundaries are oral. Given the "long period of 
time" requirement in Utah, there is little chance that the origi-
nal owners who made the agreement are still in possession of the 
land. Therefore, it is unlikely that they will be available to tes-
tify as to the agreement. Even assuming that the original parties 
are available, it is unlikely that they could remember the alleged 
47. See Comment, Built-up Boundaries, supra note 3, at 293-94. 
48. See, e.g., Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 25, 232 P.2d 202, 206-07 (1951). 
49. Browder, supra note 3, at 490-93. The requirement of dispute or uncertainty is 
necessary to justify this analogy because there cannot be arbitration without a dispute. 
50. Id. at 491. 
51. See Stith v. Williams, 227 Kan. 32, 35, 605 P.2d 86, 89 (1980); Huggans v. Weer, 
189 Mont. 334, 337-38, 615 P.2d 922, 924-25 (1980). 
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agreement. And if the original parties are still in possession, the 
party adversely affected by the agreement may not want to ad-
mit that he made it. These problems have led the courts to cre-
ate the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
2 Boundary by acquiescence 
According to many courts, the doctrine of boundary by ac-
quiescence is an extension of boundary by agreement. These 
courts presume an agreement once the elements of boundary by 
acquiescence are satisfied.62 Generally, those elements are: (1) 
occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by monuments, 
fences, or buildings, and (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, (3) for a long period of time (4) by adjoining landown-
ers.53 Because it does not require an agreement, this doctrine 
does not have the same contractual underpinnings as boundary 
by agreement. Boundary by acquiescence is actually akin to a 
prescriptive theory in which rights are created by operation of 
law. Thus, it is not necessary in boundary by acquiescence to 
show satisfaction of contractual consideration requirements, and 
the Statute of Frauds does not pose a problem.54 Rather, the 
doctrine is based on certain policy considerations which are il-
lustrated by the Utah Supreme Court in Olsen v. Park Daugh-
ters Investment Co., where the court said that boundary by ac-
quiescence is based on the policy 
that the peace and good order of society require that there be 
stability . . . in the ownership and occupation of lands . . . . 
[BJoundary lines which have been long established and ac-
cepted by those who should be concerned should be left undis-
turbed in order to leave at rest matters which may have re-
sulted in controversy and litigation . . . .66 
Because of the differences between these two doctrines, it is not 
necessary to prove the boundary was established by the parties 
as the result of a dispute or uncertainty. 
As shown above, boundary by agreement and by acquies-
cence have several important differences and are based on differ-
52. See Brown, 120 Utah at 25, 232 P.2d at 207. 
53. See Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979); Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 
2d 282, 284, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (1966); see also Recent Developments in Utah Law, supra 
note 4, at 193-94. 
54. See Comment, Built-up Boundaries, supra note 3, at 300. 
55. 29 Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 P.2d 145, 147 (1973); see also Note, supra note 43, at 
224. 
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ing rationales. However, because the requirements of these two 
boundary resolution doctrines are so similar in some respects, 
the courts have often confused their elements.66 Utah courts 
provide a good example of such confusion in boundary disputes. 
The best case to illustrate this confusion is Madsen v. Clegg™ It 
is a particularly important case because it was the first of recent 
cases to make reference to dispute and uncertainty in determin-
ing whether boundary by acquiescence applied.68 Until Madsen, 
the strong opinion of Justice Wolfe in the 1951 case of Brown v. 
Milliner had adequately illuminated that dispute and uncer-
tainty were not necessary elements of the acquiescence doctrine: 
In some of the opinions of this court on the subject of disputed 
boundaries, there are statements to the effect that the location 
of the true boundary must be uncertain, unknown or in dispute 
before an agreement between the adjoining land owners fixing 
the boundary will be upheld, citing Tripp v. Bagley in support 
thereof . . . . But the Tripp case does not require a party rely-
ing upon a boundary which has been acquiesced in for a long 
period of time to produce evidence that the location of the true 
boundary was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. That the 
true boundary was uncertain or in dispute and that the parties 
agreed upon the recognized boundary as the dividing line will 
be implied from the parties' long acquiescence.59 
In Madsen, the court failed to understand this language 
when it said that "[t]he doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
has long been recognized, and when the location of the true 
boundary between adjoining tracts of land is unknown, uncer-
tain or in dispute, the owners thereof may, by parol agreement, 
establish the boundary line . . . ."eo The court further reasoned 
that an agreement is implied from acquiescence, therefore re-
quiring uncertainty or dispute.61 
The court in Madsen describes acquiescence in terms of 
boundary by agreement, failing to see the major difference be-
tween the two doctrines. Boundary by agreement requires an ex-
press agreement between the parties. Since this doctrine is 
56. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.8, at 768; Note, In Deed!, supra note 4, at 
567-68. 
57. 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981). 
58. Id. at 729. 
59. Brown, 120 Utah at 27, 232 P.2d at 208 (citation omitted). 
60. 639 P.2d at 728. 
61. Id. at 729-30. 
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based on contract law, the agreement can be defeated if there is 
a failure of consideration. If actual knowledge of the boundary 
situation exists, the consideration of the party gaining the land 
fails because he exchanged nothing, not even a nagging uncer-
tainty, to establish the boundary. Therefore, uncertainty or dis-
pute is a necessary element of boundary by agreement. Bound-
ary by acquiescence includes the requirement of acquiescence in 
a marked boundary for a long period of time. This element is 
defeated if the parties had knowledge of the true boundary, be-
cause in that case there is no acquiescence. Since this doctrine is 
based on the operation of law—on the policy of setting bounda-
ries on an equitable basis—uncertainty or dispute is not needed 
to fulfill the requirements of contract law. The court in Madsen 
apparently thought these requirements were interchangeable.62 
In Halladay v. Cluff, three years after Madsen v. Cluff, the 
court drew on the language of Madsen in explicitly requiring un-
certainty as an element of boundary by acquiescence.63 The 
opinion in Halladay, with its new requirement, drastically 
reduces the availability of boundary by acquiescence. The court 
set an objective standard for uncertainty or dispute, requiring, 
for example, that deeds be inconsistent or that surveyors disa-
gree on the true boundary.64 This, of course, places on property 
owners the financial burden of getting their land surveyed. The 
burden is likely to be particularly noticeable when the land is 
transferred, since title insurance does not cover an incorrectly 
placed boundary. 
3. Estoppel 
Under certain facts, a boundary may be established by the 
acts or representations of the original titleholder. Even if the 
record title describes a different boundary line, detrimental reli-
ance on the title owner's misstatements of the boundary location 
may give rise to a boundary by estoppel. If the true owner of the 
62. Id. at 730. 
63. Halladay, 685 P.2d 500, 504-05 (Utah 1984). Though Justice Howe concurred in 
Madsen, 639 P.2d at 730 (Howe, J., concurring), he later explained in his dissenting 
opinion in Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984) (Howe, J., dissenting), 
that he "regarded the reference in [Madsen] to uncertainty and dispute as surplusage, 
and directed to cases where a boundary is fixed by an express parol agreement as distin-
guished from a case of boundary by acquiescence." For that reason, he explained, he 
"only concurred in the result in that case." Id. 
64. 685 P.2d at 505-06. 
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property knows that his neighbor is making improvements that 
will abut an existing fence line which the parties have errone-
ously considered as the actual boundary line, then the true 
owner may later be estopped from asserting a boundary claim 
that shows the true line running through his neighbor's newly 
constructed building. The elements of boundary by estoppel are: 
(1) representations by the true owner that the mutually ac-
cepted line is the true boundary; (2) reasonable reliance by the 
neighbor on those representations; and (3) substantial costs det-
rimentally incurred by the neighbor. In most cases, the true 
owner must have known that his representations were erroneous 
or must have been grossly negligent in making them. A court 
with its equity powers can, because of the estoppel, quiet title in 
the neighbor. 
Other equitable grounds may exist for fixing a different 
boundary than the one which the record description would es-
tablish. For instance, the Utah Supreme Court recently used the 
equitable doctrine of reformation of a deed to change the record 
boundary line to correspond with the boundary line intended by 
the parties to the conveyance.65 
II. APPLICATION OF THE LAW 
The full impact of Utah's relatively drastic departure from 
prior decisions regarding the dispute-or-uncertainty requirement 
in the boundary by acquiescence context is best illustrated by 
applying the above boundary resolution approaches used in 
other jurisdictions to the facts of a recent Utah case. This exer-
cise will show that the Utah Supreme Court has left a major gap 
in its recognition of rights to property held for long periods of 
time. 
A. The Facts 
The fact situation we shall apply comes from a Utah case 
predating the recent flurry of cases in which the Utah Supreme 
Court established its novel approach. Brown v. Peterson Devel-
opment Co.** decided in 1980, involved a large strip of land, 
seventy feet by 969 feet. Since before 1925, an old fence had 
been the practical boundary between the adjoining properties. 
65. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984). 
66. 622 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980). 
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Plaintiffs' land lay immediately to the west of the fence. How-
ever, their record title, according to a survey made in 1973, en-
ded seventy feet west of the old fence. Plaintiffs and their prede-
cessors had "occupied, possessed and used the land included in 
the disputed strip for more than 40 years."67 Defendants' land, 
on the east side of the fence, was divided into three parcels. The 
description of parcel one, on the north, overlapped the eastern 
twenty-six feet of the disputed strip. The forty-four feet of land 
between parcel one and the plaintiffs' land was not covered by 
any deed. Parcel two, in the middle, had two descriptions, the 
first overlapping the disputed strip by two feet, and the other 
reaching all the way to the eastern border of the plaintiffs' 
description. The third parcel, on the south, ended at the old 
fence. Land between the plaintiffs' description and parcels two 
and three was also not covered by any deed.68 No evidence is 
given to show that taxes were paid by either party, but it can be 
presumed that each party paid taxes for the land described in its 
deed and that no one paid taxes on the land not covered by any 
deed. 
The court ruled in Brown that the plaintiffs had good title 
to the disputed strip because their predecessors in interest had 
established title "by operation of law under the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence."69 The opinion offers, however, no 
analysis of the traditional elements of boundary by 
acquiescence. 
One unfamiliar with Utah law might immediately inquire 
why this fact situation was litigated under boundary by acquies-
cence and did not justify application of the more common doc-
trine of adverse possession. The answer is that Utah does not 
have a long-term adverse possession doctrine descended from 
the original common law. Twenty years of possession is not suffi-
cient to establish adverse-possession title in Utah.70 The claim-
ants could only have qualified under Utah's shortened seven-
year adverse possession rule, and this requires payment of taxes 
for seven consecutive years.71 The difficulty with this approach, 
however, is that property tax assessments are always based on 
67. Id. at 1176-77. 
68. Id. at 1177. 
69. Id. 
70. See Montgomery, supra note 27, at 301, 310. 
71. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-12 (1953). 
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the record metes-and-bounds description.72 Thus, only the party 
who possesses under some document including the same descrip-
tion used by the county property tax assessment records can ob-
tain property by short-term adverse possession.73 
Several commentators have pointed out that some states 
which apply adverse possession restrictively appear to compen-
sate by applying boundary by acquiescence more liberally.74 
Utah law prior to Halladay v. Cluff fits into this pattern. The 
payment-of-taxes requirement has transformed many claims 
that would be treated under the doctrine of adverse possession 
in other states to a claim relying on one of the boundary-resolu-
tion doctrines in Utah. For that reason, Utah has far more 
boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence cases 
than other jurisdictions in which this fact situation would be a 
typical adverse possession case. 
B. The Application 
The following is an analysis of each boundary dispute doc-
trine as applied to the facts of Brown. 
1. Adverse possession 
Under the long-term adverse possession a successful plain-
tiff must show the fulfillment of the five requirements listed 
above. Since the disputed strip was "occupied, possessed, and 
used . . . for more than forty years" by the plaintiffs, and the 
defendants did not interfere,75 the actual, open and notorious, 
exclusive, and continuous possession requirements are appar-
ently satisfied by the facts of Brown. 
The hostility requirement is not so easily satisfied. Hostility 
usually means possession without the permission of one legally 
72. The lack of a long-term adverse possession doctrine may also create problems 
where valuable improvements have been made in the disputed area by the nonprevailing 
party. In Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981), the court affirmed the lower 
court's order requiring plaintiff to reimburse defendant for the fair value of the shed and 
fruit trees placed on the property by defendant unless plaintiff decided to remove them 
rather than use them. Utah, like many states, has a so-called betterments statute to 
govern the situation where improvements are made by a possessor who later loses a title 
dispute regarding the property on which the improvements were made. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 57-6-3 (1986). 
73. See Montgomery, supra note 27, at 310-11. 
74. See G. NELSON & B. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND DEVELOP-
MENT 138 (2d ed. 1981). 
75. Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Utah 1980). 
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entitled to possession.76 The facts of Brown do not indicate 
whether there was permission. Thus, some jurisdictions would 
find claimants' position inadequate to establish title by adverse 
possession. These jurisdictions place the burden of showing hos-
tility on the plaintiff, thus they might find that the claimants' 
state of mind was not hostile through the full twenty-year pe-
riod.77 If the fence had been regarded all along as the actual 
boundary line that fit the claimants' record title description or if 
there was no explanation for the possession, then plaintiff could 
not show that he had the requisite hostile intent required for 
title by adverse possession. 
However, other jurisdictions hold that adverse-possession 
claimants should be allowed the benefit of a presumption that 
an otherwise unexplained possession by one who does not have 
record title is a hostile act under the requirements of adverse 
possession.78 In a court that follows this rule, the defendant 
would have to show permission. 
A question remains as to the land in Brown that was not 
covered by any deed. Apparently neither party ever had legal 
title to that portion of the property. Although the defendants 
are not the proper party from whom to seek title to that land, 
possession by plaintiffs should be sufficient to establish title by 
adverse possession against the title owner, whoever that is (pre-
sumably a prior grantor who never succeeded in conveying away 
the full strip). Because the plaintiffs paid no taxes on the un-
claimed strip, they cannot get title to it through short-term ad-
verse possession. In some states, however, (including California) 
proving that no one else paid taxes on the land satisfies the tax 
requirement in short-term adverse possession situations.79 If 
that rule were applied to the facts in Brown9 the plaintiffs would 
get only the land not covered by any deed. Of course, the plain-
tiffs would not get all the land up to the old fence unless another 
doctrine justifying such taking applies, but some land is better 
than none. 
In summary, there is a fundamental difference between ad-
verse possession and boundary by agreement. Adverse posses-
sion is based on a philosophy of a hostile claimant taking the 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. 
77. See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.7, at 761. 
78. Id, at 760. 
79. Gilardi v. Hallam, 30 CaL 3d 317, 326, 636 P.2d 588, 593,178 Cal. Rptr. 624, 629 
(1981). 
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land from the owner of record. Boundary by agreement is based 
on an actual agreement. In adverse possession cases, there is no 
agreement because the claimant establishes the boundary with-
out the consent of the other landowner. In fact, proof of an 
agreement would negate the hostility element necessary to show 
adverse possession. Conversely, there is no hostility requirement 
in either boundary-by-agreement or boundary-by-acquiescence 
cases. Notwithstanding this fundamental difference, most 
boundary dispute claimants in Utah are forced into the bound-
ary resolution doctrines because adverse possession doctrines are 
unavailable. 
2. Prescriptive easement 
Attempting to apply the Brown facts to the prescriptive 
easement doctrine will not produce the results desired by most 
property owners. Applying the doctrine will not quiet title in the 
person in possession;80 it will merely give that person a right to 
use the land in a specific manner. In Brown, the plaintiff's pred-
ecessors used the land only for farming. There were no particu-
lar lanes of ingress or egress. It is unlikely, however, that any 
court will construe farming as a mere use as opposed to posses-
sion of the land.81 Even if a court did, that use is not a viable 
option for plaintiffs since the disputed tract and the adjoining 
tracts are too small for farming.82 Therefore the doctrine of pre-
scriptive easements does not resolve the boundary dispute. 
3. Boundary dispute doctrines 
a. Boundary by agreement. This brings us to the applica-
tion of these facts to the boundary dispute resolution doctrines. 
To satisfy the requirements of boundary by agreement, the 
plaintiff must show that there was uncertainty or dispute about 
the actual boundary (which assumes that the property of the 
parties is adjoining), and that the parties agreed to set the 
boundary at a particular place.83 These requirements can rarely 
be satisfied and are therefore seldom litigated. In Brown, there 
is no evidence of any communication between the parties. Thus, 
boundary by agreement fails. 
80. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
81. See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 8.7, at 452. 
82. Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Utah 1980). 
83. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
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b. Boundary by acquiescence. Boundary by acquiescence is 
similar to boundary by agreement. Nevertheless, it works 
through the operation of law rather than through private agree-
ment.84 The four traditional requirements for boundary by ac-
quiescence are (1) occupation up to a visible line marked defi-
nitely by monuments, fences, or buildings, (2) acquiescence in 
the line as the boundary (3) for a long period and (4) by adjoin-
ing landowners.85 Since there is no contractual basis, this doc-
trine has traditionally presumed agreement by the parties and 
therefore has not required dispute or uncertainty. The court in 
Brown determined without discussion that all the requirements 
of boundary by acquiescence were easily met.86 
But Brown may have been decided differently in Utah had 
it arisen after Halladay v. Cluff. The traditional doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence does not apply after Halladay be-
cause the claimants may have had difficulty showing the newly 
required element of uncertainty or dispute at the time the fence 
was erected.87 There is no discussion of this element in Brown, 
but because the fence was so old, it is highly unlikely that evi-
dence could have been found to illuminate the circumstances 
surrounding the initial construction of the fence. Under tradi-
tional boundary-by-acquiescence reasoning, an agreement was 
implied from the fact that the fence had been erected and was 
allowed to serve as the practical boundary between the proper-
ties for such a long time. Now, however, Utah courts require an 
objective showing that the implied agreement grew out of a dis-
pute or uncertainty as to the proper location of the boundary. 
The claimants probably would be unable to carry this burden of 
proof. They would in essence have to establish the same factors 
that are required in a boundary-by-agreement case, which more 
than likely would be impossible.88 The end result would be to 
award the seventy-foot disputed strip of property to the party 
whose record title covered the disputed area—the reverse of 
Brown's result. 
84. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
85. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
86. Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Utah 1980). 
87. See supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing evidence). 
88. The court in Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah 1984), said that the 
dispute arose when a survey was made. This implies that the dispute requirement will be 
satisfied when parties acquiesce in a boundary for the required time after a survey shows 
a boundary different from the boundary acquiesced in. That kind of reasoning, however, 
contradicts the requirement that the true boundary must not be known by the parties. 
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c. Estoppel Since the defendant in Brown apparently made 
no actual representations to the plaintiff, the doctrine of estop-
pel would be held inapplicable to the facts of that case. 
III. SURVEY OF CASES 
The Utah Supreme Court has decided fourteen boundary 
cases in the past seven years.89 In this section, four of these 
cases are considered as representative of different categories: (1) 
claims that might have satisfied the general adverse possession 
requirements in other states, but were not recognized in Utah 
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; (2) claims that 
met the earlier requirements for boundary by acquiescence in 
Utah but would not meet the stricter doctrine announced in 
Halladay v. Cluff; (3) claims following the Halladay decision 
that satisfy boundary by acquiescence requirements; and (4) 
claims following Halladay that were recognized on a theory of 
equitable reformation of deeds because they would not qualify 
under the new acquiescence requirements. By looking at the 
cases chronologically, we gain a perspective of the immediate 
context from which the new Halladay requirement evolved and 
the problem it has created. 
In looking at each case we will consider what the result 
would have been if (1) Utah had an alternative adverse-posses-
sion doctrine eliminating the necessity of tax payments by the 
claimant; (2) the pre-Halladay approach to the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence had not been changed; and (3) the ad-
ditional requirement that boundary by acquiescence arise from a 
dispute or objective uncertainty were applied. 
A, Claims That Failed Under the Pre-Halladay Approach 
In Hales v. Frakes,90 the parties argued over a strip of land 
two rods wide lying between the record title boundary on the 
north and an old fence line on the south. Plaintiff owned prop-
89. These include Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984); Stratford, 689 
P.2d at 360; Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984); Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255 
(Utah 1984); Condas v. Willesen, 674 P.2d 115 (Utah 1983); Leon v. Dansie, 639 P.2d 730 
(Utah 1981); Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981); Eddington v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 
143 (Utah 1981); Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981); Brown v. Peterson 
Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980); Park v. Farnsworth, 622 P.2d 788 (Utah 1980); 
Monroe v. Harper, 619 P.2d 323 (Utah 1980); Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 
1979); and Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979). 
90. 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979). 
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erty to the north of the strip in question. Record title to the 
disputed strip was owned by defendant. The trial court refused 
to accept plaintiffs claim that she was entitled to the disputed 
property under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Es-
sentially, the court found that the fence had been built to keep 
cattle from entering plaintiffs property to the north. The fence 
was placed two rods south of the true boundary line because a 
road was to be built to join an already-existing four-rod wide 
road to the west. The fence line was the continuation of a fence 
that ran along the south side of the road on the property to the 
west of the disputed strip. Based x>n these facts, the supreme 
court agreed that plaintiff had not established boundary by ac-
quiescence because the parties had never intended the fence to 
be the boundary line.91 
This case would probably have turned out the same both 
before and after Halladay v. Cluff. After Halladay there would 
probably have been a second element missing. Because the fence 
had been built prior to 1933 by a common owner before the 
larger tract had been subdivided, the boundary was not estab-
lished to settle a dispute or an uncertainty. 
The plaintiff in Hales may, however, have been able to sat-
isfy the requirements of adverse possession if there were a stat-
ute of limitations retaining the common-law approach requiring 
a twenty-year period of possession but making no mention of 
property tax payments.92 Certainly the time period here would 
91. Id. at 560. For a case where a possessor failed to establish boundary by acquies-
cence because a line intended to be a boundary was not marked by monuments, see 
Monroe v. Harper, 619 P.2d 323 (Utah 1980). The boundary between the parties' parcels 
in Monroe was set in an old survey and marked with a row of stakes. After the line was 
set, the disputed tract was in the possession of the plaintiff who developed it with a road 
and an orchard. Approximately 25 years after the old survey, the defendant, who owned 
the land on the north, had a new survey made and found the true boundary to be about 
17 feet south of the old line. Sometime between the time ihe3e surveys were made, the 
stakes placed during the old survey disappeared. 
The supreme court ruled for the defendant based on one of the elements required 
for boundary by acquiescence—"occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by 
monuments, fences, or buildings." Id. at 325. The court construed this prerequisite 
strictly, noting that the trees and gravel roadway, though placed within the disputed 
strip, were not located on the boundary line. 
Obviously the parties knew where the old boundary was marked. Nevertheless, 
through strict construction of the requirement, the court in effect created the same result 
as in Halladay. The parties in Monroe were forced to rely on the deed description de-
spite continuous possession for 25 years. 
92. Another case where 20-year adverse possession may have been satisfied but for 
the tax requirement is Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979). In Neeley, a dispute 
over a seven-acre tract of land involved the doctrine of adverse possession but none of 
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have been sufficient; the defendant did nothing to interfere with 
plaintiffs or her predecessor's use of the property until 1974 
when defendant tore down the fence that had been constructed 
in 1933. It is unclear, however, whether sufficient adverse hostil-
ity and other elements required for adverse possession could be 
met. Apparently the defendant did not use the property north of 
the fence line during that time. If the plaintiff did and that pos-
session was uninterrupted, it is possible that the case would 
have come out in the plaintiffs favor—the reverse of the actual 
result. 
B. Claims That Succeeded Under the Pre-Halladay 
Approach 
Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co™ was a quiet title 
action involving a boundary dispute between parties owning 
property on either side of the Provo River. The defendants re-
ceived an eighty-acre tract of land on the west side of the river 
in 1883. Their deed described the middle of the river as the east-
erly boundary of their tract. The plaintiffs received their land 
east of the river three years later. Theirs was also an eighty-acre 
tract, but the deed described the tract by metes and bounds. 
The westerly boundary was a straight line that crossed the river 
at a bend and invaded the land described in the plaintiffs' 
deed.94 
The basis for the plaintiffs' suit was the Marketable Record 
Title Act.95 Under this Act, the plaintiffs' deed would have ne-
gated any prior deed. The court ruled, however, that the Mar-
ketable Record Title Act did not apply because it was super-
seded by the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.96 The court 
the boundary doctrines. The trial court's ruling in favor of the defendant landowners was 
reversed under the doctrine of adverse possession. Because defendants had never paid 
tares on the disputed parcel, the requirements of adverse possession had not been satis-
fied although defendants apparently convinced the trial court that other requirements 
for adverse possession had been fulfilled. Id. at 982. Here a party who had used and 
possessed a tract of land for more than 20 years without interruption or objection from 
the record owner was forced into court and ended up losing his claim to the property. If 
Utah had a 20-year statute of limitations for adverse possession claims, this case would 
probably have been decided differently. The policy behind both statutes of limitations 
and adverse possession in reducing conflict and cutting down on litigation was frustrated 
in this case. 
93. 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973). 
94. Id. at 423-24, 511 P.2d at 146-47. 
95. Id. at 424-25, 511 P.2d at 147; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-9-1 to -10 (1988). 
96. Olsen, 29 Utah 2d at 426, 511 P.2d at 148. 
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held that when a dispute about boundaries between properties 
arises, and a physical boundary has been acquiesced in for a long 
period of time, the conflict is presumed to be reconciled.97 Al-
though a dispute like the one required in Halladay existed, it 
was probably not a determining factor. The case would have 
come out the same with or without dispute, for uncertainty is 
traditionally presumed to exist when there is long acquiescence 
in the boundary. 
In most cases of boundary by acquiescence, a fence is built 
or a line otherwise marked for some unknown reason by an ear-
lier occupant of the land. The actual boundary is subsequently 
destroyed for one reason or another and the subsequent owners 
acquiesce in the new boundary. In such a case, there will be un-
certainty so long as there is no survey of the land. The Halladay 
case takes away this type of uncertainty by presuming knowl-
edge if a survey is possible. Therefore, the requirement effec-
tively precludes boundary by acquiescence in Utah unless there 
is a defect or mistake showing uncertainty on the deeds them-
selves rather than in the minds of the parties. 
Olsen is perhaps the only case in Utah that would have 
clearly come out the same both before and after Halladay. The 
reason for this is that the common grantor in the 1880's made a 
mistake on the deeds which created uncertainty and dispute. No 
conduct on the part of the parties could have created uncer-
tainty in the location of the boundary. 
C. Claims That Fail Under the Pos£-HaIladay Approach 
A prime example of a boundary-by-acquiescence case where 
a party lost after Halladay but would have won before is Strat-
ford v. Morgan** In 1951, plaintiffs bought a 4.77 acre tract next 
to Big Cottonwood Creek to farm as a hobby. Shortly thereafter, 
the plaintiffs built a fence along the river. They treated the land 
as their own, using it without interruption until 1979. 
In 1979, the plaintiffs had the land surveyed and found that 
the actual boundary zig-zagged across their fence and created 
two disputed parcels of land on the plaintiffs' side of the riven 
The plaintiffs then presented defendant with quitclaim deeds 
for the disputed parcels. The defendant refused to sign them. 
97. Id. at 425, 511 P.2d at 147. 
98. 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984). 
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Plaintiffs then initiated a quiet title action to get title to the 
land." 
The court held that the plaintiffs did not establish bound-
ary by acquiescence because there was no uncertainty or dispute 
as to the true boundary, since a survey was available to the par-
ties.100 All the other elements of boundary by acquiescence were 
satisfied. There was insufficient dispute because the dispute did 
not start until the 1979 survey was made.101 As in Olsen, nothing 
the plaintiff could have done would get the disputed parcels 
through any of the boundary resolution doctrines because the 
deeds accurately set forth the boundaries. The plaintiffs were 
therefore forced to give up the land that they had used for 
twenty-eight years. 
D. Claims That Succeed Under the Post-Halladay Approach 
Another approach used by the court since the Halladay de-
cision may provide a judicial alternative to claimants who previ-
ously would have relied on the doctrine of boundary by acquies-
cence. That approach is to permit reformation of a deed in order 
to allow one occupying up to a visible fence to quiet title to the 
disputed parcel even though a survey showed the actual descrip-
tion in the recorded deeds fell short of the fence. In Hottinger v. 
Jensen,102 decided three months after Halladay, the court ig-
nored the parties' arguments regarding boundary by acquies-
99. Id. at 361-62. 
100. For another case dealing with post-Halladay boundary by acquiescence, see 
Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984). In Parsons, both parties claimed a strip 
of land that was about five feet wide and 340 feet long. Title to this strip was quieted in 
the plaintiffs' predecessors in 1939. Defendant, the wrongful possessor, also acquired his 
land to the west of the plaintLTs' by warranty deed in 1972, and received a quitclaim 
deed for the disputed strip dated 1957, Since at least 1957, a fence existed, running in a 
straight line from north to south starting at the dividing line on the south and serving as 
the boundary. The fence, which placed the disputed strip on the defendant's side, ex-
isted in part until the dispute arose. 
Eoth parties paid taxes on the property from 1987 to 1976. Plaintiits paid first in six 
of those years, and in the other three years, both parties paid on the samp day with no 
record of who paid first. 
The trial court quieted title in the defendant based on boundary by acquiescence. 
The supreme court then reversed. Boundary by acquiescence failed because there was no 
uncertainty or dispute and because it was unclear whether the long time requirement 
was satisfied. Justice Howe dissented because the court did not look at all the facts 
showing the length of possession. Furthermore, he disagreed with the court's use of un-
certainty or dispute as a requirement of boundary by acquiescence. 
101. 689 P.2d at 363-64; see also supra note 88. 
102. 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984). 
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cence. Instead, defendant successfully obtained reformation of 
the deed to quiet title in her name. 
Defendant and her husband acquired the land in 1945 as 
part of a fifteen-acre parcel. They divided the property in 1958, 
keeping only the parcel which contained their home, yard, and 
garden. The larger parcel that they transferred to new grantees, 
according to the stipulated facts, was intended to be separated 
from the defendant's home property by an existing fence. After 
two further transfers of the larger parcel under the same mutual 
understanding as to the intended boundary line, plaintiffs ob-
tained the property in 1973. Plaintiffs claimed there were no 
representations made to them that the fence was the boundary 
line. Finally, in 1980, plaintiffs learned from a survey that de-
fendant had been using a ninety-foot strip north of the fence 
line that was described in the deed as plaintiffs' property. The 
actual description brought the boundary line to within a few feet 
of defendant's house. At that time plaintiffs tore down the previ-
ously erected fence, built a new one at the line described in the 
deed, and brought suit to quiet title to the disputed area. De-
fendant's counterclaim asked for reformation of the deed and ti-
tle quieted in her name.103 
The court ruled in defendant's favor, ordering reformation 
of the deed and quieting title in defendant. Plaintiffs were not 
able to prevent reformation of the deed because they were 
deemed to have inquiry notice of the mistake in the original 
deed descriptions which negated their claim to be bona fide pur-
chasers without notice. The notice arose from possession and ob-
vious use of the property by defendant and the existence of the 
fence both before and after plaintiffs' purchase.104 
The facts of this case would satisfy general long-term ad-
verse possession requirements, but lack of tax payments by the 
defendant prevented her from gaining title by adverse posses-
sion under Utah's short-term adverse possession statute. It also 
appears that the time period between 1958 and 1980 would have 
teen sufficient to satisfy the time requirements to establish 
boundary by acquiescence. The other elements required prior to 
Halladay would also have been met However, the requirement 
of objective uncertainty probably would not have been satisfied, 
so boundary by acquiescence would not have been available af-
103. Id. at 1272-73. 
104. Id. at 1273-74. 
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ter Halladay.106 A survey, the very means by which the discrep-
ancy between the record boundary description and the existing 
fence line was discovered, is a determinative factor in Halladay's 
objective uncertainty requirement.106 
The court could have determined that actions commenced 
and tried before Halladay would be decided free of the newly 
adopted prerequisite for application of boundary by acquies-
cence by refusing to give Halladay retroactive effect. It was un-
necessary to reach that issue, however, because the case pro-
vided a sufficient alternative basis for decision. 
The reformation-of-deed approach may be suitable in sev-
eral other boundary dispute situations. However, in the typical 
case the original grantor or grantee of the deed first incorporat-
ing the challenged description will not be a party in the law suit. 
Evidence and proof sufficient to permit a court to order reforma-
tion of a deed would be difficult if not impossible to discover. 
The understandings and intentions regarding boundary lines are 
generally not easy to reconstruct.107 These realities regarding the 
difficulty of accurately deciphering events from the distant past 
are part of the theoretical basis for prescriptive theories. Acts by 
the parties, in the form of long-term, uninterrupted possession, 
are better and more reliable forms of evidence as to the intent of 
the parties regarding the practical location of boundaries. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The best solution to the Utah scheme of protection for par-
ties in long-term possession of property is not to tinker with 
boundary-by-acquiescence principles but to amend the state's 
adverse-possession rules.108 The state should retain its current 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
luS. See Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500, 507 (Utah 1984). 
107. See Neeley v. Kelsch, 6CO P.2d 979 (Utah 1979). In NeeUy, a similar issue of 
mutual mistake was argued. In that case, although the original parties were present, the 
Utah Supreme Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of 
mutual mistake which wouid justify the ruling that the original deed to defendants 
should be reformed to include the disputed tract 
A similar problem arises in boundary by agreement. See supra text accompanying 
note 51. 
108. A bill proposed in the 1987 General Session of the Utah Legislature attempt to 
overturn the effect of Halladay v. Cluff. Senate Bill No. 120, Boundary By Acquiescence, 
adding UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40a-l to -5. The bill introduces a distinction between a 
"marked boundary" and the "actual boundary". A marked boundary may become the 
basis for a quiet title action if: 
(1) the marked boundary has been in place for 20 years or more; 
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seven-year statute of limitations based on payment of property 
taxes. In addition, however, the legislature should adopt an al-
ternative statute of limitations requiring a longer period—up to 
a maximum of twenty years—for claims that cannot qualify for 
the shorter seven-year period. 
This approach is the appropriate means of protecting "per-
sons in possession as quickly as is reasonably possible"109 in the 
limitation periods promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the curative and limi-
tation provisions of the Uniform Simplification of Land Trans-
fers Act.110 It is significant that this Act, which is designed to 
strengthen and streamline record titles generally,111 nonetheless 
liberally enforces the rights of persons in possession. Yet, the 
Utah Supreme Court, when faced with the same competing poli-
cies—record title compared to rights springing from long-term 
possession—leaned heavily in the other direction in order to 
strengthen the position of record title and the recording system 
generally. This attention to record title is too legalistic because 
it ignores generations of deference to the practical realities rep-
resented by the unchallenged possessory conduct of another. 
The Utah Supreme Court has eliminated an important doc-
trine in its arsenal for reaching equitable results in cases based 
on possession.112 It may not be fully satisfied with the an-
nounced principles and the apparently inconsistent results flow-
ing from the old doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. But that 
liberality in applying this boundary doctrine was justified be-
cause it was the last route of escape for a party that had exer-
cised significant possessory claims to property for substantial 
periods of time.113 
The state legislature should recognize the unfortunate situa-
tion that has now been created. It should be willing to close the 
(2) there is no evidence thai during the 20-year period any of the owners of the 
properties adjoining the narked boundary ever asserted that the marked 
boundary was other than the actual bourdary; and 
(2) all owners have used their properties only up to the marked boundary dur-
ing the 20-year period. 
Id. at § 78-40a-2. 
109. UNIFORM SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFERS ACT § 3-404 comment (1977). 
110. Id. § 3-404. 
111. See id. prefatory note. 
112. See Halladay v. duff, 685 P.2d 500, 514-15 (Utah 1984) (Howe, J., dissenting) 
(An appendix lists cases supporting the old boundary-by-acquiescence doctrine.). 
113. Id. at 509. 
982 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1988 
hole that its own unreasonable limitation on statutes of limita-
tions has created. It should provide a statutory means of block-
ing a record title owner who has been less than diligent in pro-
tecting his rights in the face of another's possessory activities. 
There appears to be no special reason why the age-old right to 
perfect adverse possession title should be limited to claimants 
who pay property taxes on the disputed property. Boundary-dis-
pute cases in particular make the tax payment requirement un-
reasonable.114 There should be a residuary statute of limitations 
for a longer period of time to cover all those claimants who do 
not qualify for any shortened time period. Payment of taxes and 
making claims under color of title are justifiable grounds for giv-
ing a claimant special treatment by allowing a shorter possessory 
period,115 but Utah's approach to statutes of limitations is inade-
quate if it does not cover parties who fit into one of the short-
ened time periods. 
114. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. 
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By contrast, establishing practical location of a boundary by the method of 
acquiescence requires the parties' knowledge of the real boundary as described 
in the deed, so that a claim of different location rests upon the principle of 
estoppel.707 In some states title will pass by prescription. Under prescription, the 
requirements of hostility and taxes are not present, but the duration of time 
requirement is; there must be no agreement by the parties, but there must be 
intent on one side and passive acquiescence on the other side to promote the lost 
grant theory. Most states do not permit title but only an easement to pass by 
prescription. Protest by one party terminates the prescription. 
Use of a boundary agreement requires proof of an actual contract between the 
adjoining landowners, written evidence to avoid the statute of frauds and, in 
many states, words to grant to transfer title and consent of spouses to release 
inchoate rights. By comparison to acquiescence, practical location requirements 
include a disputed or doubtful boundary, an agreement as to the line between the 
adjoining landowners, a taking of possession by each up to the agreed upon line, 
and holding that possession for a long period of time. In boundary disputes the 
rules of evidence are more liberal than in other forms of actions, especially 
where the original surveyor's marks have disappeared.708 The problem of 
practical location is often intertwined with that of the requirement of hostile 
intent that pertains to adverse possession.709 
§ 90.03(a)(2). Practical Location of Boundaries. 
In many jurisdictions, landowners may agree with one another as to their 
boundaries in disregard of their deeds, and in a way that binds themselves and 
their successors. This is called "practical location."710 Practical location is limited 
by the general rule that an oral agreement is not effective to establish an 
arbitrary but already marked line for an unascertained or disputed boundary,711 
707. Simms v. William Simms Hdw., 12 N.W.2d 783 (Minn 1943). 
708. Reynolds v. Bradford, 233 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. App. 1950). 
709. Carstensen v. Brown, 236 P. 517 (Wyo. 1925) (hostile intent is unnecessary if possession 
is held for the statutory time under honest mistake). 
710. Schlender v. Maretoli, 37 P2d 993 (Kan. 1934); Engquist v Wirtjes, 68 N.W.2d 412 
(Minn. 1955). In Georgia, practical location is not dependent upon the statutes regarding 
prescription or adverse possession. Bennett v. Perry, 61 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1950) (requiring only 
seven years' acquiescence or possession). Downing v. Boehringer, 349 P.2d 306 (Idaho 1960) 
(evidence of practical location of boundary could not be established without a showing that the 
location was either uncertain or unknown to the parties establishing it). In North Carolina the 
practical location rule is an exception to the doctrine that calls for monuments have first prionry. 
Yopp v. Aman, 193 S.E. 822 (N.C. 1937). 
711. Cagle v. Brady, 24 S.E.2d 865 (Ga. App. 1943). 
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nor to change a known boundary line.712 A boundary line established by adverse 
possession prior to the agreement is not uncertain and may not be established by 
oral agreement.713 The rationale of these restrictive rules is that any oral 
agreement to establish a line other than the true or marked line constitutes a 
conveyance of land in violation of the statute of frauds.714 Also, a definite 
boundary whose location is known cannot be changed by a parol agreement715 in 
the absence of subsequent adverse possession in accordance with the new line.716 
A parol agreement between the owners of adjacent land, which has been 
partitioned between them, that they will disregard the boundary fixed by the 
partition and establish another line, violates the statute of frauds when unaided 
by adverse possession.717 
Courts generally favor boundary line agreements,718 and therefore a few courts 
will enforce otherwise invalid oral agreements,719 but most, because of the statute 
of frauds, will deny enforcement of an oral boundary agreement if the true 
boundary is known.720 Practical location in some states consists of an agreement 
712. Horn v. Thompson, 58 N.E.2d 896 (111. 1945); Bercot v. Velkoff, 41 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. 
App. 1942); Wallace v. Mounts, 164 S.W.2d 541 (Ky. 1942); May v. Abernathy, 130 S W.2d 135 
(Tenn. App. 1939). 
713. Adkins v. Willis, 230 S.W.2d 32 (Ark. 1950); Hardison v. Jordan, 44 A.2d 892 (Me. 
1945) (refusing to recognize practical location in absence of disseisin). Dispute or uncertainty 
required. Farmer v. Komfuehrer, 271 S W.2d 501 (Tex. App. 1954); Brown v. Milliner, 232 P2d 
202 (Utah 1951). 
714. Schraeder Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Packer, 129 U.S. 6SS, 9 S. Ct 385, 32 L. Ed. 760 (1889); 
Alexander v. Wheeler, 69 Ala. 332 (Ala. 1881); Lewis v. Ogram, 87 P. 60 (Cal. 1906); 
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Fleetwood, 200 A. 334 (Conn. 1938); Watrous v. Morrison, 14 
So. 805 (Fla. 1894); Shahn v. Watkins, 21 S E.2d 58 (Ga 1942); Cagle v. Brady, 24 S.E.2d 865 
(Ga. App. 1943); Horn v. Thompson, 58 N.E.2d 896 (111. 1945); Wnght v. Hendncks, 58 N.E.2d 
453 (111. 1944); Bercot v. Velkoff, 41 NE.2d 686 (Ind. App. 1942); Wallace v. Mounts, 164 
S.W.2d 541 (Ky. 1942); White v. Hapeman, 5 N.W. 313 (Mich. 1880), Trussell v. Lewis, 14 N.W. 
155 (Neb. 1882); Sanford v. McDonald, 6 N.Y.S. 613 (1889); Buckner v. Anderson, 16 S.E. 424 
(N.C. 1892); Shaffer v. Hahn, 15 S.E. 1033 (N.C. 1892); Caraway v. Chancy, 51 N.C. 361 (N.C. 
1859); Bobo v. Richmond, 25 Ohio St. 115 (1874); Coughran v. Alderete, 26 S W. 109 (Tex. App. 
1894); Windsor v. Bourcier, 150 P 2d 717 (Wash. 1944); Pickett v. Nelson, 37 N.W. 836 (Wis. 
1888); Hartung v. Witte, 18 N.W. 175 (Wis. 1884). 
715. See Shaw v. Williams, 50 So. 2d 125 (Fla 1950); Jones v. Scott, 145 N.E. 378 (111. 1924); 
Duff v. Turner, 256 S.W. 1105 (Ky. 1923); Adams v. Warner, 204 N.Y.S. 613 (N.Y.A.D. 1924). 
716. Crawford v. Roloson, 152 N.E. 319 (Mass. 1926); Hale v. Arms, 119 S.E. 94 (Va, 1923), 
reh'g denied, 121 S.E. 269 (1923). 
717. Nathan v. Dierssen, 66 P. 485 (Cal. 1901). 
718. Crook v. Leinenweaver, 224 P.2d 891 (Cal. 4 Dist. App. 1950). 
719. Winborn v. Alexander, 279 S.W.2d 718 (Term. App. 1954). 
720. Jensen v. Bartlett, 286 P.2d 804 (Utah 1955) (finding, however, that there was sufficient 
uncertainty to justify agreement). 
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followed by taking possession.721 In many states, where a dispute or uncertainty 
exists as to the true line, the agreement need not be evidenced by execution of 
formal instruments.722 The agreement to settle a disputed line will be upheld723 
even if a line has in fact been established by acquiescence and is no longer 
actively disputed.724 Under proper circumstances, there may be a practical 
location725 of a doubtful boundary line by an agreement between the adjoining 
owners, followed by acquiescence in the location made and by occupancy in 
accordance with the location, and this will be binding on the owners and their 
successors.726 
721. Williams v. Pichard, 7 So. 2d 468 (Fla 1942) (agreement as to line followed by erection 
offence created boundary), Kilgore v. Leary, 180 So. 35 (Fla. 1938), Robertson v. Abernathy, 16 
S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1941). 
722. Mello v. Weaver, 224 P.2d 691 (Cal. 1950), Martin v. Lopes, 164 P.2d 321 (Cal. App. 
1945); McGinty v Interstate Land & Imp. Co., 90 S E.2d 42 (Ga. App. 1955); Roberts v. Brae, 54 
P.2d 698 (Cal. 1936) (essential elements are uncertainty or belief as to uncertainty of the line, an 
express or implied agreement fixing it, actual designation of the line and occupation thereunder). 
723. Thaxter v. Inglis, 54 P. 86 (Cal. 1898), York v. Horn, 315 P.2d 912 (Cal. App. 1957); 
Crook v. Leinenweaver, 224 P2d 891 (Cal. App 1950), Farr v Woodfolk, 45 S.E. 230 (Ga 
1903); Carstarphen v. Holt, 23 S.E. 904 (Ga. 1895), Miller v. McGlaun, 63 Ga. 435 (1879); 
Hollingsworth v Barrett, 89 S.W 107 (Ky. 1905); Ennis v Stanley, 78 N.W 2d 114 (Mich. 1956); 
Beardsley v. Crane, 54 N.W. 740 (Mmn. 1893), Ernsting v Gleason, 39 S.W. 70 (Mo. 1897); 
Schroeder v. Engroff, 144 A.2d 808 (N.J. Super L. 1958), rev'd, 155 A.2d 15 (N.J. Super. A.D. 
1959), certification granted, 157 A.2d 363 (N.J. 1960), rev'd, 162 A.2d 845 (N.J. 1960); Hinds v. 
Parmley, 315 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. App. 1958); Davis v. Miers, 308 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App. 1957) 
(prior dispute necessary); Pickett v. Nelson, 47 N.W 936 (Wis. 1891); Hass v. Plantz. 14 N.W. 65 
(Wis. 1882); Spear v. Smith, 327 P.2d 36 (Cal. App. 1958) (actual dispute or controversy is not 
necessary in California to the establishment of boundaries by implied agreement); White v. Saling, 
89 P.2d 754 (Okla 1939) (line established through pure mistake and ignorance is not a practical 
location). 
724. Helm v. Wilson, 18 P. 604 (Cal. 1888); Sloan v. Ayres, 189 S.W.2d 653 (Ark. 1945) (line 
established through pure mistake and ignorance is not a practical location). 
"There must be an uncertainty as to the true line, and some question, dispute, or controversy 
about it, which can be settled by such an agreement or acquiescence; in other words, that is certain 
which can be made certain, and, if the true line cannot be made certain by the deed and a survey, or 
by the calls and monuments mentioned in the deed, then, only, it may be made certain by an 
agreement or acquiescence of the parties." Hartung v. Witte, 18 N.W. 175 (Wis. 1884). See 
Johnson v. Squires, 75 N.W.2d 45 (Mich. 1956) (dictum). 
725. Henderson v. Walker, 122 S.E. 613 (Ga 1924); Doherty v. Egan Waste Co., I l l A. 499 
(N J. Ch. 1920); Adams v. Warner, 204 N.Y.S. 613 (N.Y.A.D. 1924). Boundary lines established 
by acquiescence; McGinty v. Interstate Land & Imp. Co., 90 S.E.2d 42 (Ga. App. 1955); Railey v. 
Heath, 88 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. App. 1955). 
726. On the subject of the location of boundary lines by agreement, See generally Weeks v. 
Walls, 180 So. 544 (Ala. 1938); Krutz v. Faught, 166 S.W.2d 655 (Ark. 1942); Mello v. Weaver, 
224 P.2d 691 (Cal. 1950); Hannah v. Pogue, 147 P.2d 572 (Cal. 1944); Nusbickel v. Stevens 
Ranch Co., 200 P. 651 (Cal. 1921); Raney v. Merritt, 238 P. 767 (Cal. App. 1925); Howatt v. 
Humboldt Milling Co., 214 P. 1009 (Cal. App. 1923); Kilgore v. Leary, 180 So. 35 (Fla 1938); 
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Practical location is simply an actual designation by the parties of the 
monuments and bounds called for by their deeds,727 and one owner cannot make 
a practical location with the other.728 The mere fact that one owner knew of a 
survey and saw the actual setting of the stakes is insufficient to establish a 
practical location in the absence of proof that the owner agreed to the line or that 
improvements were made according to the survey.729 Thus a boundary line may 
be established by agreement after controversy before the limitations period has 
run.730 In other jurisdictions, however, practical location is recognized only 
where the parties have held to the agreed line for a sufficient time for 
prescription to run.731 
Veal v. Barber, 30 S.E.2d 252 (Ga. 1944); McGill v. Dowman, 24 S.E.2d 195 (Ga. 1943), Shirley 
v. Byrd, 134 S.E. 316 (Ga. 1926); Henderson v. Walker, 122 S.E. 613 (Ga. 1924); Hart v. Carter, 
103 S.E. 457 (Ga. 1920); Loverkamp v. Loverkamp, 45 N.E.2d 871 (111. 1942); Bercot v. Velkoff, 
41 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. App. 1942); Baker v. Johnson, 138 N.E. 780 (Ind. App. 1923); Seaver v. 
Vonderahe, 127 N.E. 206 (Ind. App. 1920); Lynch v. Northwestern Laundry, 189 N.W. 748 (Iowa 
1922); Blanford v. Biven, 254 P. 1030 (Kan. 1927); Long v. Myers, 211 P. 109 (Kan. 1922); 
Shafer v. Leigh, 209 P. 830 (Kan. 1922); Fordson Coal Co. v. Howard, 168 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 
1943); Turner v. Spicer, 249 S.W. 1038 (Ky. 1923); Driskill v, Atwood, 237 S.W. 388 (Ky. 1922); 
Holbrooks v. Wright, 220 S.W. 524 (Ky. 1919); Harper v. Learned, 6 So 2d 326 (La. 1942); 
Borneman v. Milliken, 124 A. 200 (Me. 1924); Matthews v. McLouth, 205 N.W. 580 (Mich. 
1925); Martin v. Hays, 228 S.W. 741 (Mo. 1921); La Rue v. Bungenstock, 249 S.W. 402 (Mo. 
1923); Union Tp v. Cotton Hill Tp., 243 S.W. 333 (Mo. 1922); Ashauer v. Peer, 147 S.W.2d 144 
(Mo. App. 1941); Doherty v. Egan Waste Co., 111 A. 499 (N.J. Ch. 1920), Barcus v. Blanchard, 
39 A.2d 499 (N.J. Ch. 1944), ajf d, 42 A.2d 271 (N.J. Err. & App. 1945); Magnolia ConstR.R. v. 
McQuillan, 121 A. 734 (N.J. Err. & App. 1923); Adams v. Warner, 204 N.Y.S. 613 (N.Y.A.D. 
1924); Watford v. Pierce, 124 S.E. 838 (N.C. 1924); Rocher v. Williams, 80 P.2d 649 (Okla. 1938); 
Colley v. Henderson, 228 P. 923 (Or. 1924); Reisland v. Schick, 224 P. 827 (Or. 1924); Aldrich v. 
Brownell, 120 A. 582 (R.I. 1923); Home Owners1 Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 141 P.2d 160 (Utah 1943); 
Carstensen v. Brown, 236 P. 517 (Wyo. 1925). Cf Marshall v. Jameson, 134 S.E. 573 (Va. 1926). 
727. Wells v. Jackson Iron Mfg. Co., 47N.H. 235 (1866). 
728. Crook County Comm'rs v. Sheridan County Comm'rs, 100 P. 659 (Wyo. 1909). 
729. Dye v. Ebersole, 234 S.W.2d 376 (Ark. 1950); Hruby v. Lonseth, 116 P. 26 (Wash. 1911). 
730. Walters v. Meador, 201 S.W.2d 24 (Ark. 1947); Sloan v. Ayres, 189 S.W.2d 653 (Ark. 
1945); Furlow v. Dunn, 144 S.W.2d 31 (Ark. 1940); Scales v. Wood, 112 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. App. 
1959); Downing v. Boehringer, 349 P.2d 306 (Idaho 1960); Nitterauer v. Pulley, 82 N.E.2d 643 
(111. 1948); Loverkamp v. Loverkamp, 45 N.E.2d 871 (111. 1942) (disputed line may be established 
by parol agreement and possession); Turner v. McCarty, 124 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. 1939); Hotze v. 
Ring, 115 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1938) (agreed line may ripen into title without consideration or oral 
agreement); Cochrane v. Milligan, 101 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 1960); Lake for Use & Benefit of 
Benton v. Crosser, 216 P.2d 583 (Okla 1950). 
731. Collins v. Burchfield, 110 S.E.2d 368 (Ga. 1959) (a disputed boundary may be fixed by 
oral agreement accompanied by taking possession or by acquiescence for the statutory period); 
Hardison v. Jordan, 44 A.2d 892 (Me. 1945) (Maine does not recognize a practical location that 
does not amount to a disseisin); Neill v. Hake, 93 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. 1958); Simms v. William 
Simras Hdw., 12 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1943); Dunkel v. Roth, 300 N.W. 610 (Minn. 1941) 
(Minnesota will not recognize practical location except where coupled with the statute of 
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Practical locations do not act as a transfer of title, because this would violate 
the statute of frauds.732 Instead, they are treated as fixing by agreement where the 
true line, as set out in the respective title claims, really is.733 Hence the necessity 
that the line be in controversy or doubt.734 
The mutual promises of the parties are sufficient consideration to sustain an 
agreement to locate an uncertain boundary line.735 The basis of a practical 
location is the intent of the parties to settle a questionable line.736 
Where there has been a bona fide dispute as to the true line and the parties 
have made,737 acted upon and acquiesced in a peaceful settlement, a legal line is 
established.738 The agreement may be expressed or implied.739 Adjacent 
landowners can only agree in writing for consideration on a boundary known not 
to be the true one.740 If the agreement is based on an honest mistake, it is not 
binding upon the parties.741 An agreement or acquiescence in a wrong boundary 
when the deed gave the true lines or they were known is treated as a mistake and 
is not binding upon the parties.742 The location of a common boundary by a 
grantor is binding upon the grantees.743 
Practical location requires that there be a dispute or uncertainty in regard to 
the boundary line. That there is a question between adjoining landowners in 
regard to the boundary line is not enough to serve as the foundation of a valid 
and conclusive agreement between them. Thus, where a question arose as to the 
boundary line, and one of the parties expressed themselves as satisfied with the 
line of the survey, and a partition wall was placed upon the line, it was found 
that the line was not drawn and fixed as a compromise of any dispute between 
limitations, an express agreement or estoppel); Holt v. Hutcheson, 333 P.2d 530 (Okla. 1958); 
Nagel v. Philopsen, 90 N.W.2d 151 (Wis. 1958). 
732. Bordes v. Leece, 208 N.W. 780 (Ky. 1919). 
733. Wood v. Bapp, 169 N.W. 518 (S.D. 1918); Wade v. McDougle, 52 S.E. 1026 (W. Va. 
1906). 
734. Myrick v. Pert, 180 P. 574 (Mont. 1919); Kingsley v. Jacobs, 149 P.2d 950 (Or. 1944). 
735. Guy v. Lancaster, 34 So. 2d 10 (Ala. 1948). 
736. Davis v. Wright, 249 S.W.2d 979 (Ark. 1952); Talmadge v. Moore, 220 P.2d 588 (Cal. 4 
Dist App. 1950). 
737. Taylor v. Trustees of Glenlock Public School, 194 S.E. 169 (Ga. 1937); Kunkle v. 
Clinkingbeard, 162 P.2d 892 (Idaho 1945); Bercot v. Velkoff, 41 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. App. 1942); 
Kingsley v. Jacobs, 149 P.2d 950 (Or. 1944). 
738. Warner v. Noble, 282 N.W. 855 (Mich. 1938). 
739. Peake v. Azusa Valley Sav. Bank, 99 P.2d 382 (Cal. 3 Dist App. 1940). 
740. Andrews v. Andrews, 113 S.E.2d 47 (N.C. 1960). 
741. Practical location not influenced by fraud or mistake will establish a line. Lake for Use & 
Benefit of Benton v. Crosser, 216 P.2d 583 (Okla. 1950); Thompson v. Bain, 183 P.2d 785 (Wash. 
1947). 
742. Rast v. Fischer, 236 P.2d 393 (Cal. App. 1951); Nitterauer v. Pulley, 82 N.E.2d 643 (111. 
1948), requiring a dispute before the neighbors can agree upon a true line. 
743. Angell v. Hadley, 207 P.2d 191 (Wash. 1949). 
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the parties, and that the true line was susceptible to demonstration by a survey 
correctly made. The agreed line was not, therefore, binding upon either party. 
The only effect of the agreement was that the parties were to accept and abide by 
the line established by the survey if it was the true line, and not otherwise. When 
it was shown that this was not the true line, either party was free to repudiate the 
erroneous line.744 
The rule that a parol agreement between owners of adjacent tracts of land that 
a certain line is the true dividing line is binding if accompanied by possession to 
the agreed line, or otherwise duly executed, and if the boundary is indefinite, 
unascertained or disputed, is in applicable where, at the time of the parol -
agreement, there is no line in dispute.745 It is only where the true line is unknown 
or is difficult to ascertain, and the parties by agreement establish the line to settle 
a disputed and vexatious question as to the boundary line between them, that the 
parties are bound.746 
If the beginning point is definite, neither the intention nor the belief of 
grantors can change it.747 Some courts have required that there be facts present 
sufficient to constitute an estoppel before a boundary "agreement" is considered 
effective.748 Other courts require only that facts show that a contract was entered 
into by the parties.749 An agreement may be presumed from long acquiescence.750 
There need be no actual dispute between the parties as a basis for an agreed 
line if the true boundary lines are in fact uncertain, and can be determined only 
by judicial inquiry.751 Where one adjoining owner, in the absence of the 
neighbor, causes the position of a fence to be changed, the fact that the neighbor 
does not seek to put the fence back, but merely disputes it with the owner who 
made the change, does not estop the neighbor from demanding such 
restoration.752 The owners of adjoining lands are not bound by an erroneous 
survey made at their request, without knowledge of the error.753 Thus, to establish 
744. Sanford v. McDonald, 6 N.Y.S. 613 (1889). 
745. Taylor v. Trustees of Glenlock Public School, 194 S.E. 169 (Ga. 1937). 
746. Randleman v. Taylor, 127 S.W. 723 (Ark. 1910); Kandlik v. Hudek, 6 N.E.2d 196 (01. 
1936). McNeil v. Hadden, 76 So. 2d 160 (Ala. 1954) (a section line cannot be changed by parol or 
by adverse possession). 
747. Denson v. Kuehne, 215 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App. 1948), rev'a\ 219 S.W.2d 1006 (Tex. 
1949). 
748. Meyers v. Johnson, 15 Ind. 261 (1860); Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, 336 P.2d 525 
(Cal. 1959) (practical location requires an uncertainty of a boundary, agreement fixing the line and 
acquiescence for period of statute of limitations or change in position amounting to estoppel). 
749. See Jack Young, Parol Agreements Relating To Land Boundaries, 11 ARK. L. REV. 431 
(1957). 
750. Seidenstricker v. HoltzendorfX 217 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1949). 
751. Silvarer v. Hansen, 20 P. 136 (Cal. 1888). 
752. Russell v. Producers Oil Co., 70 So. 92 (La. 1915). 
753. Wesley v. Sargent, 38 Me. 315 (1854). 
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an agreed boundary line, it is necessary to show that there was an uncertainty or 
belief of uncertainty in the location of the line, that there was an agreement 
express or implied in fixing the line and that there was an actual designation of 
the line upon the ground and occupation in accordance with that line.754 The 
dispute or uncertainty as to the true line is sufficient consideration for the 
making of an agreed boundary.755 
Silence during the making of a survey does not constitute an agreement to 
make the survey a boundary.756 In order for an agreement to settle a disputed 
boundary line to be binding, there must be (a) a line sufficiently definite to be 
traced and (b) a definite agreement that this is to be the line.757 The agreed upon 
boundary line must be definite, certain and clearly marked and must result from 
an uncertain boundary.758 
A line between adjoining lands marked by a fence and mutually acquiesced in 
by the adjoining landowners for ten years as the division line between their 
properties becomes the true line.759 Where the location of a boundary line has not 
been established, or is otherwise doubtful, and the adjoining landowners orally 
agree to a survey and to be bound by the result, they are concluded by the line 
run by the survey.760 
There is a marked distinction between an undertaking to settle a dispute 
boundary, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the mere consent of the 
parties to adopt a dividing line, in regard to which line no doubt or dispute has 
arisen and where both parties are mistaken as to the true line. The acquiescence 
or admission of the owner of land, made under a mistake as to rights, should 
neither estop nor prejudice the owner from subsequently enlarging possession to 
754. Roberts v. Brae, 54 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1936); Schneider v. Pascoe, 118 P.2d 860 (Cal. App. 
1941) (the required dispute consists of uncertainty of mind of the parties as to the location of the 
boundary line); Johnston v McFerren, 3 N.W.2d 136 (Iowa 1942) (oral agreement followed by 
possession and improvement conclusively settled line); White v. Saling, 89 P.2d 754 (Okla. 1939) 
(if the line was located through ignorance and mistake, it is not a practical location); Marathon Oil 
Co. v. Gulf Oil Co., 130 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App. 1939), modified, 152 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1941) (a 
parol agreement based on a mutual mistake of fact is not enforceable in the absence of estoppel 
elements making disregard of it inequitable). 
755. Hotze v. Ring, 115 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1938). 
756. Bunch v. Bunch, 276 S.W.2d 705 (Ark. 1955); Horn v. Hays, 243 S.W.2d 3 (Ark. 1951). 
757. Dye v. Ebersole, 243 S.W.2d 376 (Ark. 1951); Reel v. Walter, 309 P.2d 1027 (Mont. 
1957) (burden of proof is on one seeking to show agreed location of boundary). 
758. Walters v. Meador, 201 S.W.2d 24 (Ark. 1947); Steele v. University of Kentucky, 174 
S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1943) (lines must be established on the ground and possession taken). 
759. Mullahey v. Serra, 264 N.W. 63 (Iowa 1935). See Thompson v. Schappert, 294 N.W. 580 
(Iowa 1940); Fishman v. Nielson, 53 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1952) (adjoining landowners may 
establish boundary line by acquiescence). 
760. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Timms, 116 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. App. 1938); Farmer v. Kornfuehrer, 271 
S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App. 1954) (the boundary must be in dispute and the agreement must fix a 
certain boundary). 
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the limits of the true title, provided no actual adversary possession has 
intervened to defeat the title. This has long been the settled rule.761 
Where adjoining owner deliberately erect monuments, fences or improve-
ments on a line between their lands with the understanding that it is the true line, 
it amounts to a practical location762 but the mere fact that an owner sets a fence 
within the owner's boundary does not give the adjoining owner the right to the 
land fenced out.763 It must first be considered if the fence is merely temporary 
and erected without the intention of marking the boundary, so that it cannot be 
regarded as a boundary fence; also, it cannot be so regarded if its location is the 
result of fraud or mistake. Nevertheless, a practical loction may be along a 
wrong line, and either of the parties so making the location may be estopped to 
claiming the true line,764 when the parties have acquiesced in the location over a 
long period of years.765 While a landowner is not compelled to build a fence, 
where an owner builds a fence on a line laid out by surveyors, it is in a sense a 
monument which is held out as the true line and which will estop the builders 
from denying the right of innocent purchasers obtaining land to regard it as such 
after its establishment for many years.766 
It has been held that where a barn and a fence built on the rear line of a lot 
encroached on the adjoiner, and upon tearing down the barn a fence was built on 
the same line, a practical location was made by acquiescence and the adjoiner 
was estopped to claim to true line.767 If one owner merely permits an adjoining 
owner to construct a fence on an asserted boundary line, the owner is not 
761. Mr. Justice Lamar said: "The decisions in the other States generally support the rule that 
owners of adjacent tracts of land are not bound by consent to a boundary which has been defined 
under a mistaken apprehension that it is the true line, each claiming only the true line, wherever it 
may be found, and that in such case neither party is precluded or estopped from claiming his [or 
her] own rights under the true one when it is discovered." Schraeder Mm & Mfg. Co. v. Packer, 
129 U.S. 688, 9 S. Ct. 385, 32 L. Ed. 760 (1889). See the following cases. Jenkins v. Trager, 40 F. 
726 (C.C.S.D. Miss. 1889); Perich v. Maurer, 155 P. 471 (Cal. App. 1915); Honaker v. Heatly, 131 
P. 759 (Cal. 1913); Redman v. Redman, 240 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. 1951); Buchanan v Ashdown, 24 
N.Y.S. 1122 (1893); Ham v. Smith, 15 S.W. 240 (Tex. 1891); Smith v Davis, 45 Va. 50 (1847); 
Hatfield v. Workman, 14 S.E. 153 (W. Va. 1891), White v. Ward, 14 S.E. 22 (W. Va. 1891); Hass 
v. Plantz, 14 N.W. 65 (Wis. 1882). 
762. Perich v. Maurer, 155 P. 471 (Cal. App. 1915); Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co. v. Wilson, 89 
S.E.2d 476 (Ga 1955). 
763. Sheldon v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 126 N.W. 1056 (Mich. 1910); McNeil v. Hadden, 76 So. 
2d 160 (Ala. 1954) (where two persons agree on a boundary line, but title is not taken by adverse 
possession, a deed running only to the survey line and not to the agreed line does not pass title to 
land lying between the survey line and the agreed line). 
764. Lane v. Jacobs, 152 N.Y.S. 605 (N.Y.A.D. 1915). 
765. Granada v. D'Allesandro, 160 N.Y.S. 602 (1916). 
766. Rippey v. Harrison, 119 P. 178 (Wash. 1911). 
767. Lane v. Jacobs, 152 N.Y.S. 605 (N.Y.A.D. 1915). 
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estopped thereby from questioning the correctness of such line.768 If an owner of 
land repudiates a boundary which has long been observed, and insists on a 
survey to determine the line as fixed by the government, that owner cannot 
afterward insist on the location by acquiescence.769 When a practical location is 
not induced by fraud or mistake, it concludes the parties and those in privity with 
them.770 It has been so held where, after long acquiescence, a location was found 
to vary from the course called for in the deeds and grants under which the parties 
claimed before agreeing to the line.771 However, an irregular pasture fence 
running from tree to tree on or near the line, and which was in a sense a practical 
location based on an error and acquiesced in, was held to not preclude either 
party from asserting the ownership of the land beyond the true line. A practical 
location made by a mutual grantor is binding on the grantees,772 for it is 
presumed to be the line mentioned in the deeds.773 
An agreement that settled a disputed boundary is a finality and cannot be 
disturbed, even though the parties afterwards learn that the true line could have 
been found, or the parties were mistaken as to the true line.774 The fact that a 
768. Fuelling v. Fuesse, 87 N.E. 700 (Ind App. 1909). Mere acquiescence in occupancy does 
not constitute a boundary line agreement; Drew v Muniford, 324 P.2d 240 (Cal. App. 1958). 
769. Michael v. Megan, 115 N.W. 483 (Iowa 1908). 
770. Goltermann v. Schiermeyer, 28 S.W. 616 (Mo. 1894). 
771. Laughlin v. Francis, 105 N.W. 360 (Iowa 1905). 
772. Turner v. Creech, 108 P. 1084 (Wash. 1910). 
773. Herse v. Mazza, 91 N.Y.S. 778 (N.Y.A.D. 1904). 
774. Peebles v. McDonald, 188 S.W.2d 289 (Ark. 1945); E.O. Barnett Bros. v. Gentry, 173 
S.W. 424 (Ark. 1915); Taylor v. Rudy, 137 S.W. 574 (Ark. 1911); Payne v. McBride, 131 S.W. 
463 (Ark. 1910); Young v. Blakeman, 95 P. 888 (Cal. 1908); Silvarer v. Hansen, 20 P. 136 (Cal. 
1888); White v. Spreckels, 17 P. 715 (Cal. 1888); Truett v. Adams, 66 Cal. 218 (1884); Cavanaugh 
v. Jackson, 27 P. 931 (Cal. 1891); Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619 (1864); Carr v. Schomberg, 232 
P.2d 597 (Cal. App. 1951); McGill v. Dowman, 24 S.E.2d 195 (Ga. 1943); Idaho Land Co. v. 
Parsons, 31 P. 791 (Idaho 1892); Wright v. Hendricks, 58 N.E.2d 453 (111. 1944); Fisher v. 
Bennehoff, 13 N.E. 150 (111. 1887); Rosenmeier v. Mahrenholtz, 101 N.E. 721 (Ind. 1913); Horton 
v. Brown, 29 N.E. 414 (Ind. 1891); Cleveland v. Obenchain, 8 N.E. 624 (Ind. 1886); Pitcher v. 
Dove, 99 Ind. 175 (1884); Welborn v. Kimmerling, 89 N.E. 517 (Ind. App. 1909). Seberg v. Iowa 
Trust & Sav. Bank, 119 N.W. 378 (Iowa 1909); Leifheit v. Neylong, 117 N.W. 4 (Iowa 1908); 
Central Trust Co. v. Moffitt, 171 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1943); Hocker v. Keeton, 115 S.W. 784 (Ky. 
1909); Hughes Lbr. Co. v. Valentine, 106 S.W. 839 (Ky. 1908); Grigsby v. Combs, 21 S.W. 37 
(Ky. 1893); Breakey v. Woolsey, 112 N.W. 719 (Mich. 1907); Jones v. Pashby, 35 N.W. 152 
(Mich. 1887); Smith v. Hamilton, 20 Mich. 433 (1870); Houston County v. Burns, 148 N.W. 115 
(Minn. 1914); Foard v. McAnnelly, 114 S.W. 990 (Mo. 1908); Atchison v. Pease, 10 S.W. 159 
(Mo. 1888); Schad v. Sharp, 8 S.W. 549 (Mo. 1888); Majors v. Rice, 57 Mo. 384 (1874); Hills v. 
Ludwig, 24 N.E. 596 (Ohio 1889); Bobo v. Richmond, 25 Ohio St. 115 (1874); Walker v. Devlin, 
2 Ohio St 593 (1853); Joy v. Palethorpe, 152 P. 230 (Or. 1915); Ungaro v. Mete, 27 A.2d 826 
(R.I. 1942); Levy v. Maddox, 16 S.W. 877 (Tex. 1891); Harrell v. Houston, 17 S.W. 731 (Tex. 
1886); Linneyw. Wood, 17 S.W. 244 (Tex. 1886); Provident Nat'l Bank v. Webb, 128 S.W. 426 
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boundary line established by agreement of the parties is not the true boundary 
line, that the agreement does not correctly locate the boundary line, and that the 
parties to the agreement were mistaken as to its correct location, does not affect 
the validity of the oral agreement establishing the boundary line, and the parties 
will be held to the line agreed on.775 A boundary line fixed by agreement of the 
adjoining landowners constitutes an "agreed boundary," in contradistinction to 
the "geographical" or "surveyed boundary."776 
After a disputed boundary has been established by agreement, a subsequent 
by the parties to the agreement and their privies, by the same description as that 
under which the title was acquired and possession held prior to the agreement, 
will pass the title according to the agreed boundary.777 If the agreed line is 
marked by monuments, subsequent purchasers would be bound to take notice of 
them for this reason;778 but, if the agreement is susceptible of clear proof, it is 
undoubtedly binding upon subsequent purchasers, even though there are no 
visible monuments of the agreed line.779 An agreement between adjoining 
landowners, fixing their boundary, executed either by a marked line or by actual 
adverse possession, carries notice to all the world of the fact.780 An oral 
agreement as to boundaries was binding on a subsequent owner acquiring title 
through tax deed.781 
The parties to an effectual agreement establishing a boundary line must be 
owners in fee of the lands contiguous to the disputed or uncertain boundary.r82 
Only owners abutting on a disputed line may make agreement fixing its 
location,783 and it has been held that a municipality as well as any other owner 
may by agreement determine the boundary line of its property.784 While a 
mortgagor may make such an agreement, the agreement will not be binding on 
the mortgagee or those claiming under the mortgagee.785 
(Tex. App. 1910); Voight v. Raby, 20 S.E. 824 (Va. 1894); Gwynn v. Schwartz, 9 S E 880 (W. 
Va. 1889). 
775. Shelor v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 103 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App. 1937). 
776. Peebles v. McDonald, 188 S.W.2d 289 (Ark. 1945). 
777. Smith v Catlm Land & Imp. Co., 22 S.W. 1083 (Mo. 1893); Smith v. McCorkle, 16 S.W. 
602 (Mo. 1891); Louisiana & Texas Lbr. Co. Dupuy, 113 S.W. 973 (Tex. App 1908), Brown v 
Milliner, 232 P.2d 202 (Utah 1951). 
778. Boyd v. Graves, 17 U.S. 513, 4 L. Ed. 628 (1819); Ingram v. Tucker, 152 S.W. 957 (Ky. 
1913). 
779. Dudley v. Elkins, 39 N.H. 78 (1859). 
780. Warden v. Addington, 115 S.W. 241 (Ky. 1909). 
781. Euse v. Gibbs, 49 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1951). 
782. See Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619 (1864). 
783. Krutz v. Faught, 166 S.W.2d 655 (Ark. 1942) (law favors boundary settlements); Hunter 
v Malone, 108 S.W. 709 (Tex. App. 1908). 
784. Muchenberger v. Santa Monica, 275 P. 803 (Cal. 1929). 
785. Orr v. Hadley, 36 N.H. 575 (1858). 
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Location of boundaries by parties at or before the time of purchase is 
competent.786 The fact that a purchaser of land has not yet paid the consideration 
for the purchase does not invalidate a parol agreement made by the purchaser 
with the adjoining owners fixing the boundary line between their lands.787 An 
agreement between a vendor and a proposed purchaser fixing the boundary line 
between the part to be purchased and the part retained by the vendor, followed 
by the completion of the sale, taking possession, and making improvements in 
reliance on the agreement is conclusive upon the parties.788 
An agreement between a grantor and the grantee's husband fixing the division 
line between the land conveyed and that retained by the grantor at a line 
different from the one stated in the deed, in consequence of which the grantor 
extended improvements up to the new line, is not binding on the grantee when 
the agreement and the improvements were made without her knowledge.789 The 
agreement or acquiescence of one heir does not bind the other heirs, who are all 
tenants in common of the property.790 The location of a boundary line by an agent 
of the owner will not necessarily bind the owner in a subsequent controversy 
between the owner and an adjoining owner.791 
A mere intruder is not allowed to question the boundaries defined in a deed, 
and assert the title to a portion of the land to be in an adjoining owner, especially 
when it appears that the grantee by the deed has had long-continued possession 
of the land in accordance with the boundaries described in the deed.792 
Parol evidence cannot be admitted to establish an act as a practical location of 
boundaries.793 It must be shown that boundary monuments were erected prior to 
or contemporaneously with the execution of the deed before such parol is 
admissible.794 Where it can be proved that the grantor and the grantee went upon 
the land and made a physical survey of the land, giving a boundary that was 
actually run and marked, and a corner was made, the party claiming under the 
deed will hold according to the agreed line, notwithstanding a varying 
description.795 
786. In re Freeman, 128 S.E. 404 (N.C. 1925). 
787. Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 27 P. 931 (Cal. 1891). 
788. See Seberg v. Iowa Trust & Sav. Bank, 119 N.W. 378 (Iowa 1909). 
789. Mitchell v. Brawley, 39 N.E. 497 (Ind. 1895). See Matthews v. French, 92 S W. 634 (Mo. 
1906). 
790. Lagow v Glover, 14 S.W. 141 (Tex. 1890). 
791. O'Hara v. O'Brien, 40 P. 423 (Cal. 1895). 
792. Stembridge v. Britschu, 20 S.W. 278 (Ky. 1892); Brown v. Hodges, 65 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 
1951) (holding that parol evidence could not be admitted to show that the adjoining landowners 
had agreed upon a line other than that set forth in the deeds). 
793. Brown v. Hodges, 65 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1951). 
794. Yopp v. Aman, 193 S.E. 822 (N.C. 1937). 
795. Dudley v. Jeffress, 100 S.E. 253 (N.C. 1919). 
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A stranger to the chain of title cannot take advantage of a boundary agree-
ment.796 A common grantor may establish a line that is binding on the grantees 
and their successors.797 Such a boundary line agreement may be implied as well 
as express.798 A section line cannot be relocated by agreement.799 A practical 
location is binding upon all successors in interest and privities to the parties,800 
but it does not affect adjoining landowners who are not parties to the 
agreement.801 
COMPUTER-ASSISTED RESEARCH 
LEXIS: Boundar! w/10 locat! w/5 practical 
§ 90.03(a)(3). Fences as Boundaries. 
Whether a fence line has been established as a boundary depends on the intent 
of the parties at the time the fence is constructed and on the parties' subsequent 
conduct with respect to the fence. A fence does not establish a line in the 
absence of an agreement to that effect.802 
A permanent division fence may have the effect of establishing conclusively 
the boundary line between adjoining owners.803 Where a permanent fence was 
796. Draper v. Griffin, 142 P.2d 772 (Cal. App. 1943); Kunkle v. Clinkingbeard, 162 P.2d 892 
(Idaho 1945) (a tenant cannot bind his landlord to a practical location). 
797. Martin v. Hobbs, 270 P.2d 1067 (Wash. 1954); Beck v. Loveland, 222 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 
1950). 
798. McGinty v. Interstate Land & Imp. Co., 90 S.E.2d 42 (Ga. App. 1955). 
799. Alford v. Rodgers, 6 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1942). 
800. Needham v. Collamer, 211 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1942); McRae Land & Timber Co. v. Ziegler, 
65 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1953); Smith v. Lanier, 42 S.E.2d 495 (Ga. 1947); Bringardner Lbr. Co. v. 
Bingham, 251 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1952); Ekberg v. Bates, 239 P.2d 205 (Utah 1951); Scales v. 
Wood, 112 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. App. 1959) (a parol agreement as to a boundary line is void). Contra 
Clements v. Cox, 327 S.W.2d 83 (Ark. 1959) (parol agreement may fix line). 
801. Martin v. Lopes, 170 P.2d 881 (Cal. 1946). 
802. Thomas v. Harlan, 178 P.2d 965 (Wash. 1947); Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 141 
P.2d 160 (Utah 1943) (a fence erected by the owner of both tracts is not a boundary line); Johnson 
v. Szumowicz, 179 P.2d 1012 (Wyo. 1947) (a fence built at a variance from the true line purely for 
convenience does not establish a new line). 
803. Deery v. Cray, 77 U.S. 263, 19 L. Ed. 887 (1869); Parkman v. Ludlum, 69 So. 2d 434 
(Ala. 1953) (brick foundation and line of rotted fence posts marked boundary line); Chambless v. 
Jones, 71 So. 987 (Ala. 1916); Shelton v. Malette, 301 P.2d 18 (Cal. 4 Dist. App. 1956) (fences 
may be considered monuments and may constitute an agreed line); Stalcup v. Lingle, 131 N.E. 852 
(Ind. App. 1921); McBeth v. White, 253 P. 212 (Kan. 1927); Warsaw v. Swearngen, 295 S.W.2d 
174 (Mo. 1956) (so also houses); Martin v. Hays, 228 S.W. 741 (Mo. 1921); Borgeson v. Tubb, 
172 P. 326 (Mont 1918); Glenn v. Yoder, 339 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1959); Midland Valley R.R. v. 
toiler, 262 P. 1967 (Okla. 1927); Davis v. Lynham, 247 P. 294 (Utah 1926); Warren v. Mazzuchi, 
148 P. 360 (Utah 1915); Windsor v. Sarsfield, 119 P. 1112 (Wash. 1912). Johnson v. Whelan, 98 
P.2d 1103 (Okla. 1940), overruling Reynolds v. Wall, 72 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1937) (in Oklahoma a 
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SUMMARY: 
CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL REPORTS SUMMARY 
In an action involving a boundary dispute between coterminous landowners, the trial court found that uncertainty had existed as 
to the location of the true boundary line, and that there had been an agreement to establish the boundary at the fence dividing 
the lot, so as to support application of the agreed-boundary doctrine based upon the long-standing acceptance of, and 
acquiescence in, the location of the fence. As a consequence, the trial court concluded that, under the agreed-boundary doctnne, 
defendants should be awarded title to the disputed area up to the claimed boundary fence. (Superior Court of Sacramento County, 
No. CV512339, A. Richard Backus, Judge.) The Court of Appeal, Third Dist., No. C013651, affirmed, and in view of that disposition, 
concluded it was unnecessary to reach the parties' remaining challenges. 
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and remanded the matter to that court with directions to 
address plaintiffs' remaining contentions. The court held the trial court erred in resolving the dispute by applying the agreed-
boundary doctrine and determining that the existing fence line was an agreed boundary. Since defendants claimed title to the 
disputed strip of land under the agreed-boundary doctrine, they had the burden of proving each element, which they failed to do. 
Although the presence of the fence suggested a lengthy acquiescence to its existence, that circumstance alone did not nullify the 
doctrine's other requirements (uncertainty as to the true boundary, and an agreement between the landowners establishing that 
boundary). Moreover, when existing legal records provide a basis for fixing the boundary, as they did in the present case, there is 
no justification for inferring, without additional evidence, that the prior owners were uncertain as to the true boundary, or that 
they agreed to fix their common boundary at the location of a fence. The agreed-boundary doctrine is a narrow theory that, 
absent compliance with all of the doctrine's requirements, may not be relied upon to supersede legal descriptions set forth in 
deeds. This encourages landowners to resolve their dispute by resorting to title searches, deed descriptions, and other objectively 
certain methods that afford a superior opportunity to reach an amicable, nonlitigious resolution of the dispute. (Opinion by George, 
J., with Lucas, C. J., Arabian, Baxter and Werdegar, 33., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Mosk, 3., with Kennard, J., 
concurring.) 
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^ ^ ^ ( l a ) C 4 ^ i a ^ ± ( l b ) CA(la^±{lc) Boundaries § 6— Establishment of Boundaries by Agreement or Acts of Parties-
- Agreed- boundary Doctnne—Applicability—As Affected by Legal Records and Absence of Proof of Landowners' Uncertainty 
and Agreement. - - In an action between coterminous landowners involving a boundary dispute, the trial court erred in resolving the 
dispute by applying the agreed-boundary doctrine and determining that an existing fence line was an agreed boundary. Since 
defendants claimed title to the disputed strip of land under the doctrine, they had the burden of proving each element, which they 
failed to do. Although the presence of the fence suggested a lengthy acquiescence to its existence, that circumstance alone did not 
nullify the doctrine's other requirements (uncertainty as to the true boundary, and an agreement establishing that boundary). 
Moreover, when existing legal records provide a basis for fixing the boundary, as they did in the present case, there is no justification 
for inferring, without additional evidence, that the prior owners were uncertain as to the true boundary, or that they agreed to fix 
their common boundary at the location of a fence. The doctrine is a narrow theory that , absent compliance with ail of the doctrine's 
requirements, may not be relied upon to supersede legal descriptions set forth in deeds. This encourages landowners to resolve their 
dispute by resorting to title searches, deed descriptions, and other objectively certain methods that afford a superior opportunity to 
reach an amicable, nonlitigious resolution of the dispute. 
[See 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Real Property, §§ 159, 160.] 
CA(2^±(2) Boundaries § 6—Establishment of Boundaries by Agreement or Acts of Parties—Agreed-boundary Doctrine-
-Rationale and Effect. --The agreed-boundary doctrine constitutes a firmly established exception to the general rule that accords 
determinative legal effect to the description of land contained in a deed. When coterminous owners, being uncertain of the true 
•!.•-_ -r a-i_- u ~ — A - ~ . ,A^^^~iir**A ;« 4-i-t^ ;*- »-,a<-<r-kD/~4-:wA WflflHe snrAA imnn H-e t n i o \r\raHrm mark if- nnnn f h p nrniinH nr hllllld l in 
i it, occupy on each side up to the place thus fixed, and acquiesce in such location for a period equal to the statute of limitations, 
• under such circumstances that substantial loss would be caused by a change of its position, such line becomes, in law, the true 
ie called for by the respective descriptions, regardless of the accuracy of the agreed location as it may appear by subsequent 
easurements. The object of the rule is to secure repose, to prevent strife and disputes concerning boundaries, and to make titles 
irmanent and stable. If a measurement is made and the line is agreed on and acquiesced in as required by this rule, it is binding on 
id applicable to all parties to the agreement and their successors by subsequent deeds. 
3±{3) Boundaries § 6—Establishment of Boundaries by Agreement or Acts of Parties—Agreed-boundary Doctrine-
llements. --The agreed-boundary doctrine requires that there be an uncertainty as to the true boundary line, an agreement 
itween the coterminous owners fixing the line, and acceptance and acquiescence in the line so fixed for a period equal to the 
atute of limitations or under such circumstances that substantial loss would be caused by a change of its position. 
^ ± ( 4 ) Boundaries § 6— Establishment of Boundaries by Agreement or Acts of Parties—Agreed-boundary Doctrine-
lements--Agreement to Establish Boundary—As Inferred From Fence. --A fence, which might in and of itself be of an 
icertain, temporary, or equivocal nature, is not the type of substantial structure from which an agreement to accept an agreed 
iundary reasonably may be inferred for purposes of resolving a boundary dispute pursuant to the agreed-boundary doctrine, in the 
isence of evidence that uncertainty on the part of the property owners led to their agreement to rely upon the fence as evidence 
their common boundary. 
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>INIONBY: GEORGE, J. 
PINION 
'49] [ * *1035 ] [ * * * 8 7 ] GEORGE, J. 
r i :+When coterminous landowners are uncertain as to the true location of their common boundary, they may establish that boundary 
agreement, pursuant to a legal theory commonly referred to as the "agreedboundary" doctrine. This case presents the question 
lether a court should [ *50] apply that doctrine to resolve a boundary dispute where available legal records provide a reasonable 
sis for fixing the boundary and the party relying upon the doctrine fails to establish that uncertainty as to the location of the true 
undary led to an agreement between the landowners to create a boundary at an agreed-upon location. We hold that the doctrine is 
ipplicable under these circumstances. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which affirmed the trial court's 
ding that the doctrine applied to this case. 
intiffs E. Jackson and Theressa Bryant and defendants Reed and Jean Blevins own adjoining parcels of real property in Herald, 
ated in a rural portion of southern Sacramento County, east of Gait. The parcels resulted from a division of "Lot 57," a 10.88-acre 
contained within a 1-square-mile tract of land that was divided in 1909 into 64 parcels, each approximately 10 acres in size. Lot 
, the largest lot within the subdivision, is configured as shown in the following diagram (which is not drawn to scale): 
*1036 ] [ * * * 8 8 ] [SEE DIAGRAM IN ORIGINAL] 
e original owners of Lot 57, Sheldon and Melda Brandenburger, also were the developers and subdividers of the entire 64-lot 
Ddivision. The subdivision was surveyed in 1909 and was recorded in 1910. The parties to the present dispute do not dispute the 
:uracy of the 1909 survey. At the [ *51] time the Brandenburgers created the subdivision, they conveyed the west one-half of 
: 57 to the Haak family, plaintiffs' predecessors in interest, and retained the east one-half for themselves. x In 1965, the 
indenburgers conveyed the "East one-half" of Lot 57 to Aldridge and Patricia Reynolds who, in turn, conveyed the property to 
:endants 12 years later, in 1977. Plaintiffs acquired title to the west one-half of Lot 57 in 1986. 
30TNOTES 
Although the deed evidencing the Brandenburgers* conveyance of the west half of Lot 57 to the Haaks is not contained in the 
cord, and therefore its exact language has not been adduced, the parties do not dispute that the Haaks received the west one-
ilf of the parcel. Nor is there any dispute as to the accuracy of subsequent deeds, which are contained in the record and refer 
the "west half " of Lot 57. 
:endants testified they were familiar with the property for many years prior to purchasing it. Mrs. Blevins, who had lived in the area 
more than 50 years, recalled having seen the property many times while riding a covered wagon with her family riding-group in the 
>0's and 1960's. She recalled from as early as the 1950's seeing barbed wire perimeter fencing in the area, although the particular 
bed wire fence dividing Lot 57 apparently was erected by the Reynoldses at some point after they acquired the east half of Lot 57 
L965. After defendants acquired the property in 1977 from the Reynoldses, who had informed defendants that the barbed wire 
ce marked the boundary line, defendants replaced the fence with a sturdier, pipe panel fence erected at the same location. 
)rtly after purchasing the west one-half of Lot 57, plaintiffs, in the course of laying out a fence line upon the perimeter of their 
eel, discovered a discrepancy between the approximately 5.3 acres to which thev believed thev WPI-P pnt-friprf rhac*»H nnnn •> 
of the lot's north and south borders) and the area actually enclosed by the fence, which appeared to be approximately 4.9 acres in 
size. Defendants were unable to explain the discrepancy. Plaintiffs hired a surveyor, Monty Seibel, the owner of a local surveying 
[ * *1037 ] [ * * * 8 9 ] business, to identify the true boundaries of the property. 
Upon surveying Lot 57, Seibel discovered that the fence erected by defendants, at the same location as the previous barbed wire 
fence, was not located on the true boundary between the eastern and western halves of the property. In reaching this conclusion, 
Seibel verified his survey measurements against those set forth on the 1909 subdivision map, finding no significant discrepancies. 
Employing what he testified was the standard method for locating a property boundary where there has been a subdivision, Seibel 
identified the location of the boundary separating the parties' parcels [ *52] by dividing Lot 57 into portions of equal area by means 
of a line drawn parallel to the outside boundary of the first parcel conveyed, that is, a line drawn parallel to the western edge of the 
west one-half of Lot 57. Defendants did not dispute Seibel's methodology in conducting his survey (which Seibel recorded, pursuant 
to Business and Professions Code section 8762) or its accuracy, and, in fact, stipulated to the admission in evidence of the survey at 
trial. As illustrated in the diagram, this survey fixed the true boundary separating the west and east halves of Lot 57 at a line east of 
the fence defendants had erected--approximately 11 feet east on the south border, widening to approximately 42 feet east at the 
north border. 
Seibel's survey thus identified a strip of land, comprising approximately 0.4 acres, bordered on the east by the true boundary 
separating the parties' parcels, and on the west by the fence constructed by defendants. The rightful ownership of this strip of land, 
contested by the parties, is the subject of the present proceedings. When the Reynoldses owned the east portion of Lot 57, they 
used this land as the site for a septic tank and leach field, in order to service a recreational vehicle parked there. After acquiring title 
from the Reynoldses, the defendants made similar use of the land, employing it for the additional purposes of siting a horse corral and 
pasture, a storage trailer, and a woodlot. Defendants regularly tnmmed the eucalyptus trees to which the barbed wire fence had been 
attached, and maintained the property so as to reduce the risk of fire. 
After making unsuccessful attempts to persuade defendants to move the location of the fence that divided Lot 57, plaintiffs sued to 
recover possession of the disputed strip of land, to quiet t i t le, for trespass, and for damages. Defendants cross-complained for 
declaratory relief to establish the boundaries, to quiet t i t le, for a prescriptive easement, and for damages and fees. After a court trial 
on the parties' respective claims, the trial court, among other findings, tentatively found no evidence to support application of the 
agreed-boundary doctrine to the facts of the present case, stating, at the conclusion of closing arguments: "[ I ] don't believe that 
there has been any testimony ... to indicate there is any sort of dispute that arose when the persons got together and made an 
agreed fence." Ultimately, however, despite the absence of such evidence, the trial court found that an uncertainty existed as to the 
location of the true boundary line, and that an agreement to fix the boundary at the fence also existed, so as to support application 
of the agreed-boundary doctrine, based upon the long-standing acceptance of, and acquiescence in, the location of the fence. As a 
consequence, the trial court concluded that , under the agreed-boundary doctrine, defendants should be awarded title to the disputed 
area up to the claimed boundary fence. The Court of Appeal affirmed as to this issue and, in view of that disposition, [ *53] 
concluded it was unnecessary to reach plaintiffs' remaining challenges to the trial court's findings that defendants had acquired title 
to a portion of the disputed area based upon a theory of adverse possession, and that defendants were entitled to a prescriptive 
easement as to the balance of the disputed area. Plaintiffs thereafter sought review from this court. 
II. 
CA(la)±(la) Plaintiffs' contention that the disputed area belongs to them is premised upon the uncontroverted survey performed by 
Monty Seibel in 1987, which, as noted, was not at variance with either the original subdivision map drawn in 1909, when Lot 57 was 
drawn and subdivided, or with the undisputed deed [ * * 1038 ] [ * * * 9 0 ] descriptions of the respective parcels, each of which refers 
to the ownership of one-half of Lot 57. Plaintiffs further contend that, in the present era of sophisticated surveying techniques and 
ready access to legal descriptions of real property aided by computer networks and other modern technology, the justification for the 
agreed-boundary doctrine, upon which the Court of Appeal relied in concluding the disputed area belonged to defendants, has 
withered and all but disappeared. Plaintiffs argue that the Court of Appeal's expansive application of the doctrine undermines the 
significance of legal descriptions and encourages litigation and that , therefore, as a matter of policy, the agreed-boundary doctrine 
should not apply when the true boundary is objectively certain--that is, when a reliable legal description of the true boundary exists. 
Accordingly, they urge this court to narrow the application of the doctrine to only those cases in which "legal records fail to settle a 
boundary dispute." ( Mesnick v. Caton (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1248. 1256 T228 Cal.Rptr. 7791.) 
In response, defendants contend the disputed area rightfully belongs to them, noting that the barbed wire fence separating the 
parcels had stood for several years without controversy as the apparent boundary between the west and east "halves" of Lot 57. 
Defendants contend the Court of Appeal correctly held it was reasonable, in view of the long-standing presence of the fence, to infer 
that the parties' predecessors in interest were uncertain as to the location of the true boundary separating the parcels, and agreed 
to rely upon the fence as the boundary. Thus, defendants contend, the Court of Appeal properly applied the agreed-boundary 
doctrine. 
As we shall explain, we reject defendants' contentions. In our view, the Court of Appeal adopted an unduly expansive interpretation of 
the agreed-boundary doctrine and improperly rejected the analysis set forth in other, well-reasoned Court of Appeal decisions that 
have held the doctrine is not properly applicable in cases, such as this one, in which there is no evidence [ *54] that prior owners of 
adjoining parcels of real property entered into an agreement to resolve a boundary dispute and where available legal records provided 
a reasonable basis for fixing the boundary. In the present case, because defendants, while relying upon the agreed-boundary 
doctrine, failed to demonstrate that an uncertainty as to the true boundary line led the prior coterminous owners to agree to fix the 
boundary separating the parties' respective parcels of real property at the location of the barbed wire fence, we conclude that the 
Court of Appeal erred in upholding the application of the agreed-boundary doctrine. 
Notwithstanding the conclusion we reach in this case, we decline to limit application of the agreed-boundary doctrine to instances in 
which existing legal records are inadequate to settle a boundary dispute. As previous cases have explained, such an inflexible rule 
would risk destabilizing long-standing agreements--made in good faith by coterminous property owners in order to resolve uncertainty 
as to the location of their common boundaries--that might, for any one of several reasons, be at variance with legal property 
descriptions or survey results. Instead, we reaffirm the vitality of the requirements necessary to establish the applicability of the 
agreed-boundary doctrine, set forth in Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church (1959) 51 Cal.2d 702 T336 P.2d 5251. (See also Martin v. 
innac M Q A ^ *?« r * i ?d fii R fi?4 1*170 P 2d 8811 fdiscussina the oolicv in favor of according stability to boundary agreements adopted 
good faith by coterminous landowners and acquiesced in for a period longer than the statutory period of limitations for adverse 
>ssession].) 
[(2)±(2) HN2~+ The agreed-boundary doctrine constitutes a firmly established exception to the general rule that accords 
iterminative legal effect to the description of land contained in a deed. One early case thus explains the basis for the agreed-
>undary doctrine: "[T]he rule has been established that when such [coterminous] owners, being uncertain of the true position of the 
ommon boundary described in their respective deeds], agree upon its true location, mark it upon the ground, or build up to it, 
:cupy on each side up to the place [ * *1039 ] [ * * * 9 1 ] thus fixed and acquiesce in such location for a period equal to the statute 
limitations, or under such circumstances that substantial loss would be caused by a change of its position, such line becomes, in 
N, the true line called for by the respective descriptions, regardless of the accuracy of the agreed location, as it may appear by 
ibsequent measurements.... [P] ... [P] The object of the rule is to secure repose, to prevent strife and disputes concerning 
lundaries, and make titles permanent and stable.... If a measurement is made and the line agreed on and acquiesced in as [*55] 
quired by this rule, it is binding on and applicable to all parties to the agreement and their successors by subsequent deeds." ( 
)una v. Blakeman (1908) 153 Cal. 477, 481-482 T95 P. 8881: see also Mello v. Weaver (1950) 36 Cal.2d 456, 459-460 T224 P.2d 
[11; Martin v. Lopes, supra. 28 Cal.2d at PP. 622-627: Hannah v. Poaue (1944^ 23 Cal.2d 849, 856-857 T147 P.2d 5721: 5 Miller & 
arr, Cal. Real Estate (2d ed. 1989) Adjoining Landowners, § 14.1, pp. 304-308.) 
^ ± ( 3 ) Although the agreed-boundary doctrine is well established in California, our case law has recognized that the doctrine 
^periy may be invoked only under carefully specified circumstances. As this court stated in Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra. 
Cal.2d 702, 707: " H / v 3 Trhe requirements of proof necessary to establish a title by agreed boundary are well settled by the 
cisions in this state. [Citations.] The doctrine requires that there be [1] an uncertainty as to the true boundary line, [2] an 
reement between the coterminous owners fixing the line, and [3] acceptance and acquiescence in the line so fixed for a period 
ual to the statute of limitations or under such circumstances that substantial loss would be caused by a change of its position." 
>/d.) 
the years since we reiterated in Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra. 51 Cal.2d 702, the requirements of the agreed-boundary 
ctrine, numerous Court of Appeal decisions have held that the doctrine should not be applied broadly to resolve boundary disputes 
lere there is no evidence that the neighboring owners entered into an agreement to resolve a boundary dispute and where the true 
undary is ascertainable from the legal description set forth in an existing deed or survey. (See, e.g., Armitaae v. Decker (1990) 218 
I.App.3d 887, 902-904 T267 Cal.Rptr. 3991: Mesnickv. Caton. supra. 183 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1256-1258: Finiev v. Yuba County 
iter Dist. (1979^ 99 Cal.App.3d 691. 698-701 f l 6 0 Cal.Rptr. 4 2 3 U The common theme of these decisions is a deference to the 
nctity of true and accurate legal descriptions and a concomitant reluctance to allow such descriptions to be invalidated by 
plication, through reliance upon unreliable boundaries created by fences or foliage, or by other inexact means of demarcation. 
^
l d
^ ± C l b ) In the present case, because defendants claimed title to the disputed strip of land under the agreed-boundary doctrine, 
2y had the burden of proving each element necessary to establish the agreed boundary, including an agreement between the 
terminous landowners to fix their common boundary at an agreed-upon line. Plaintiffs contend defendants failed to meet their 
rden of proving the existence of such an agreement. The Court of [ *56] Appeal rejected this contention and, in doing so, declined 
follow the reasoning set forth in a recent decision rendered by another court in Armitaae v. Decker, supra. 218 Cal.App.3d 887. As 
! shall explain, we conclude the Court of Appeal in the present case erred in rejecting the analysis set forth in Armitage. 
Tiitage v. Decker, supra. 218 Cal.App.3d 887, like the case before us, involved coterminous landowners whose lots were separated 
an old fence. In Armitage, the plaintiff's survey, based upon the legal description of the plaintiff's lot set forth in the deed, 
sealed that the placement of the fence reduced the size of the defendant's parcel by departing from the true boundary between 
i parties' properties. Claiming ownership of the disputed strip of land on an adverse possession theory, the plaintiff contended he 
s entitled to the land under the agreed-boundary doctrine. [ * *1040] [ * * * 9 2 ] The trial court, rejecting the plaintiff's 
i tention that his land extended to the fence, entered judgment for the defendant. The Court of Appeal affirmed, observing that, 
hough the elements of uncertainty as to the true boundary and agreement to fix a boundary may be inferred from acceptance of a 
ice as a boundary for many years, the plaintiff was not entitled to prevail, because " ^ ^ ' • p roo f of acquiescence in the existence of 
ence without evidence of an agreement to take the fence as a boundary is not sufficient to establish an agreed boundary." ( Id . . 
p. 900.) Thus, the plaintiff failed to establish his case, because he "offered no direct proof that the fence had been built to resolve 
loining owners' uncertainty as to the boundary between their lands.... [P] ... Absent proof of acceptance of the fence as a boundary 
owners on both sides, there was no basis for an inference of uncertainty and agreement." ( Id . , at p. 901.) 
* court in Armitage, like the court in a similar case, Mesnickv. Caton. supra. 183 Cal.App.3d 1248, observed that strong policy 
tifications counsel against an expansive application of the agreed-boundary doctrine when a legal description of the true boundary 
sts: 'The doctrine of agreed boundaries arose as a means to settle disputes over boundaries at a time when surveys were 
:oriously inaccurate and the monuments and landmarks they described often could not be found in later years. [Citations.] Given 
! difficulties of fixing boundaries according to the old surveys, courts properly recognized boundary lines which had served for 
gthy periods of time as a practical boundary. [Citation.] The purpose of the doctrine of agreed boundaries is ' "to secure repose 
J prevent l i t igation."' [Citations.] The doctrine is based on a policy of giving stability to agreements adjusting a disputed boundary ' 
a method adopted in good faith by the parties themselves to settle the controversy, and because it is the most satisfactory way 
ereby a true boundary line may be determined, and tends [ *57] to prevent l i t igation."' [Citations.] [P] In more recent times, 
vever, accurate surveys are possible and verifiable recorded deeds are the rule.... As recognized in Mesnick, to allow the doctrine 
agreed boundaries to supersede recorded legal descriptions of the property where, as here, they are fully consistent, would not 
/ destroy the significance of recorded instruments but would foster litigation rather than preventing it. [Citation.] While the 
:trine of agreed boundaries has never been intended to be a means of divesting an unconsenting landowner of his property 
ation], this is precisely its effect when used to overcome long-standing accurate legal descriptions of property." (Armitaae v. 
:ker. supra. 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 903.) 
)ur view, the Court of Appeal in the present case incorrectly dismissed the sound loaic set forth in Armitaae Aithmmh in r^r+ain 
Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, 51 Cal.2d 702, properly may support an inference that the coterminous landowners agreed to 
rely upon the fence in fixing an uncertain boundary, we believe the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that such an inference is 
warranted in the present case. 
A comparison of the facts of the case before us with those underlying Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, 51 Cal.2d 702, is 
instructive. Ernie involved a property dispute over the ownership of a strip of land, slightly less than one foot wide and one hundred 
forty feet in length. In 1925, the defendant's predecessor in interest (like the defendant, a church), purchased a parcel of land 
adjoining the property owned by plaintiff's predecessor in interest. Shortly after having a survey made of the property, the 
defendant's predecessor constructed a rectory and a cement walkway (with a fence embedded in it) upon the strip of land in 
question. These improvements remained in place for more than 26 years without objection from the adjoining owner, the plaintiff's 
predecessor. At some point after purchasing the lot adjacent to the defendant's property, the plaintiff commissioned a new survey of 
the land, based upon the descriptions set forth in the recorded deeds, and, when that survey indicated the disputed land fell within 
[ * *1041 ] [ * * * 9 3 ] the description contained in the plaintiff's deed, the plaintiff sued to establish her ownership of that strip. On 
these facts, the court in Ernie held: "It may be inferred that there was an uncertainty as to the true [boundary] at the time the 
structures were erected [presumably because the defendant's predecessor had a survey conducted immediately prior to construction 
of the rectory, walkway and fence], which uncertainty was settled by practical location on the ground at that time and was agreed 
to by the then coterminous owners." (51 Cal.2d at p. 708.) Accordingly, the court in Ernie held that the defendant [ *58] properly 
held title to the disputed strip of land under the agreed-boundary doctrine. 
In the present case, by contrast, there is no evidence that the original barbed wire fence dividing Lot 57 was erected to resolve 
uncertainty as to the location of the property boundary that separated the west and east halves of the original lot. The record is 
silent as to when, or why, the fence was built. Although the presence of the fence since at least 1977 suggests a lengthy 
acquiescence to its existence (on the part of plaintiffs' predecessors in interest), that circumstance alone did not nullify Ernie's other 
requirements--namely, that there be an uncertainty as to the location of the true boundary when the fence was erected, and an 
agreement between the neighboring property owners to employ the location of the fence as the means of establishing the boundary. 
(51 Cal.2d at p. 707.) In the present case, there is no evidence to support the existence of either one of these prerequisites. As the 
court in Armitage explained, H / V 5+when existing legal records provide a basis for fixing the boundary, there is no justification for 
inferring, without additional evidence, that the prior owners were uncertain as to the location of the true boundary or that they 
agreed to fix their common boundary at the location of a fence. (218 Cal.App.3d at pp. 901-903.) In view of the significant policy 
considerations set forth in Armitage, the agreed-boundary doctrine should not be invoked under the circumstances of the present 
case to trump the boundary established by the legal records. ( Id. at pp. 902-903.) 
C. 
We are aware of certain judicial authority, emanating from other jurisdictions, supporting the proposition that a conveyance of the 
"west half " and "east half " of real property does not necessarily signify that a mathematically equal division has been created, and 
that therefore such terminology may create an "uncertainty" as to the location of the common boundary of the parcels. Yet these 
decisions are patently distinguishable from the present case. (See Brewer v. Schammerhorn (1958) 183 Kan. 739 T332 P.2d 526, 5281 
[rejecting an equal mathematical division of 163.69835 acres, where one parcel was described as the "south half" but the previously 
deeded north parcel was referred to not as the "north half," but as "the North 80 acres precisely"]; People v. Hail (1904) 43 Misc. 117 
f88 N.Y.S. 276. 2791 ['The words 'east half ' and 'west half ' in a deed, while naturally importing equal division, may lose that effect 
when it appears that at the time some fixed line or known boundary or monument divides the premises somewhere near the center ...." 
(Italics added.)].) In contrast to the parties in the cited decisions, defendants in the present case failed to present any evidence 
[ *59] suggesting that, at the time Lot 57 was subdivided (or at any point thereafter), anything other than an equal division was 
intended. To the contrary, the uncontroverted testimony of plaintiffs' surveyor was that , in view of the general, unqualified language 
set forth in the legal descriptions of the properties, the subdivision of the original lot created "west" and "east" halves of equal area. 2 
FOOTNOTES 
2 Monty Seibel's survey revealed Lot 57 to be 10.88 acres in size; as noted above, the assessor's map indicated the lot was 10.63 
acres in size. This discrepancy fails to establish that prior owners were uncertain as to the location of their common boundary, or 
that they agreed to rely upon the barbed wire fence to identify that boundary. Seibel opined that the discrepancy resulted simply 
from the assessor's not possessing sufficient information as to the location of the true boundary, thus causing the assessor to 
draw a north-south line at the center of Lot 57 as a matter of "convenience" for assessment purposes. An employee of the 
county tax assessor's office, who testified on behalf of plaintiffs, in substance confirmed this view. Therefore, the discrepancy 
between Seibel's survey and the county tax assessor's information has no bearing upon defendants' contention that the fence 
dividing Lot 57 constitutes the actual boundary between the west and east halves of the lot. 
[ * *1042 ] [ * * * 9 4 ] As noted previously, the record contains absolutely no evidence supporting the premise that the barbed wire 
fence was erected to resolve uncertainty on the part of the parties' predecessors in interest as to the true location of the boundary 
separating the properties. As others aptly have observed, barriers are built for many reasons, 3 only one of which is to act as a visible 
boundary between parcels of real property; other considerations include aesthetics, the control of livestock, and the need to 
constrain young children from wandering too far from a residence. (See generally, Stamford v. Tromblv (1919) 181 Cal. 372, 375 T186 
P. 599] [because fence had been built to control catt le, and not as an agreed boundary, the court rejected the defendant's claim to 
ownership of land based upon the agreed-boundary doctrine]; Dooley's Hardware Mart v. Trigg (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 337, 339-341 
f75 Cal.Rptr. 7451 [where parties testified that a fence located one foot from their common boundary had been erected to comply 
with a local ordinance and did not result from an agreement to fix an uncertain boundary, the agreed-boundary doctrine did not 
apply]; see also Mesnickv. Caton. supra. 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 1258: Finlev v. Yuba County Water Dist.. suora. 99 Cal.App.3d at PP. 
700-701.) Moreover, the precise placement of a fence may be influenced by a multitude of factors, only one of which is the location 
of one's property line; other considerations include the suitability of the terrain to accept the fence, the presence of nearby 
landscaping, the skill of the builder, and even the subsequent movement of the fence through disrepair, pressure exerted by livestock, 
or loss of lateral and subjacent support. 
FOOTNOTES 
i See Frost, Mending Wall (1914) ("Before I built a wall I'd ask to know/What I was walling in or walling out."). 
4 W ± ( 4 ) Thus, a fence--which, in Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra. 51 Cal.2d at page 708. we observed "night in and of 
tself] be of an uncertain, [ *60] temporary or equivocal nature"--is not the type of "substantial structure[]" from which an 
greement to accept an agreed boundary reasonably may be inferred in the absence of evidence that uncertainty on the part of the 
noperty owners led to their agreement to rely upon the fence as evidence of their common boundary. CA(lc)±{lc) On the record 
sfore us, we conclude that defendants, as the parties invoking the agreed-boundary doctrine as the basis for their claim of title to 
le disputed strip of land, have not met their burden of proof under the test we set forth in Ernie. 
rere we to hold that, in the absence of the explicit requirements set forth in Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, 51 Cal.2d 702. 
Iapidated--and perhaps meandering--fences constitute a sufficient basis for displacing the legal descriptions set forth in recorded 
Beds, we would be taking a significant step backward toward the days of unrecorded agreements and frontier justice, thereby 
jecting added uncertainty into this area of the law and spawning much needless litigation. The expansive interpretation of the 
jreed-boundary doctrine embraced by the Court of Appeal, and urged by the defendants here, clearly would add unnecessary 
cpense and stress to the prospect of real property ownership in California. By contrast, our affirmation of the doctrine as a narrow 
leory that, in the absence of compliance with the requirements set forth in Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra. 51 Cal.2d at 
*qe 707. may not be relied upon to supersede legal descriptions set forth in deeds, will encourage coterminous landowners to resolve 
leir disputes not by erecting imperfect barriers, "drawing lines in the sand," or hauling neighbors into court, but by resorting to title 
sarches, deed descriptions, and other objectively certain methods that afford the parties a superior opportunity to reach an 
nicable, nonlitigious resolution of their disputes. 
>r the foregoing reasons, we reject the Court of Appeal's application of the agreed-boundary [ * *1043 ] [ * * * 9 5 ] doctrine to the 
cts of this case. In our view, an unduly broad application of the doctrine tacitly encourages a lack of due diligence on the part of 
operty owners by tempting them not to consult legal descriptions in an effort to reach amicable resolution of their disputes, and 
stead induces property owners to resort to the courts to resolve their boundary disputes. We should not promote such a potentially 
igious alternative. Guided by the principles set forth in Ernie , and mindful of the objectively certain legal description of defendants' 
operty and the absence of any evidence suggesting that uncertainty as to the true boundary led to the creation of a "fence-made" 
jreed boundary, we approve the reasoning set forth in Armitage v. Decker, supra. 218 Cal.App.3d 887. and hold that defendants 
ive failed to establish the "uncertainty" and "agreement" required in order to establish an agreed boundary. 
*61] III. 
»e judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. Because, in view of its disposition of the agreed-boundary issue, that court did not 
ach plaintiffs' other challenges to the judgment of the trial court, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to 
Idress plaintiffs' remaining contentions. 
cas, C. J., Arabian, J., Baxter, J., and Werdegar, 3., concurred. 
SSENTBY: MOSK, J. 
ISSENT 
DSK,J. 
lissent. 
e majority concede that the agreed-boundary doctrine applies whether or not there is an available legal document--such as a deed 
map--that purports to describe the location of the "true" boundary. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 53-54.) However, they then in effect 
»ate two different standards of proof: if a legal description is available, the party asserting the agreed boundary must present direct 
idence "that the prior owners were uncertain as to the location of the true boundary [and] that they agreed to fix their common 
Lindary at the location of a fence." (Maj. opn., ante, p. 58.) If no legal description is available, the rule that has been recognized 
d applied in California throughout most of this century--regardless of whether a legal description is available--still applies, namely, 
i t direct evidence of uncertainty and agreement is not necessary because 'The court may infer that there was an agreement 
tween the coterminous owners ensuing from uncertainty or a dispute, from the long-standing acceptance of a fence as a boundary 
tween their lands." ( Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church (1959) 51 Cal.2d 702. 708 f336 P.2d 5251 {Ernie); Mello v. Weaver (1950) 36 
1.2d 456. 460 T224 P.2d 6911: Hannah v. Poaue (1944) 23 Cal.2d 849. 856 Q47 P.2d 5721 [citing earlier cases].) I see no reason for 
s bifurcated standard of proof; I would continue to apply the well-settled inference of uncertainty and agreement whether or not a 
al description is available. 
5 fundamental issue in this case is which type of boundaries are entitled to more respect under the law: the boundaries to which 
i adjacent landowners have themselves agreed, or the boundaries assertedly described in legal documents. The agreed-boundary 
:trine is intended to give the former priority over the latter. 'The object of the [agreed-boundary doctrine] is to secure repose, to 
vent strife and disputes concerning boundaries, and make titles permanent and stable" by giving legal effect to boundaries that 
acent landowners have designated by building some physical barrier-- [ *62] such as a fence--and leaving that physical barrier in 
ce for many years. ( Youna v. Blakeman (1908) 153 Cai. 477. 482 T95 P. 8881: see also Mello v. Weaver, supra. 36 Cal.2d 456. 
)-460: Martin v. Lopes (1946) 28 Cal.2d 618. 622-627 T170 P.2d 8811: Hannah v. Poaue. supra. 23 Cal.2d 849. 856-857: Finlev v. 
la County Water Dist. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 691. 699 f l 60 Cal.Rptr. 4231.) The doctrine is premised on the belief that the 
lectations and understandings of adjacent landowners regarding the location of their boundary are vitally important and that courts 
>uld defer [ * *1044 ] [ * * * 9 6 ] to these expectations and understandings whenever possible; it does not contemplate that courts 
>uld disregard landowners' expectations merely because there is some leaal document t-haf nnmnrtc tn nia^o fho hr»..r»H^, i» , .~™ 
other location. The agreed-boundary doctrine thus reflects the notion expressed by Oliver Wendell Holmes over a century ago that: 
'The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, ..." 
(Holmes, The Common Law (1881) at p. 41.) 
The majority's holding guarantees that a contrary result will occur. By requiring direct evidence of uncertainty and agreement in cases 
in which some document purports to describe the true boundary, the majority are ensuring that in most cases an agreed boundary will 
not prevail. Often it will be virtually impossible to prove that the individuals who built a physical barrier did so expressly to resolve a 
dispute about the location of their common boundary; indeed, as in this case, it will often be uncertain who actually constructed the 
physical barrier, much less whether it was built to resolve a dispute regarding the location of a boundary. (See Backman, The Law of 
Practical Location of Boundaries and the Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy (1986) B.Y.U. L. Rev. 957, 964-965 [direct evidence 
of agreement is often unavailable because most agreements are oral and the original owners may no longer be in possession, may not 
remember the agreement, or may not admit they made it] .) The majority's holding therefore does much more than modify the 
subtleties of the standards of proof; it ensures that in most cases deeds and maps will be given priority over agreements long 
accepted between adjacent landowners. For this reason, in cases in which a legal description is available, the majority's newly 
created rule turns on its head the central policy underlying the agreed-boundary doctrine, i.e., that agreements between adjacent 
landowners are entitled to deference. 
The majority also put too much faith in legal descriptions. The mere fact that a deed or map contains a legally adequate written or 
pictorial description of a boundary does not mean that an actual physical boundary assertedly laid out in accordance with that 
description will so accurately reflect the "true" [ *63] boundary that courts should give it priority over the agreed boundary. The 
degree to which a physical boundary assertedly laid out in accordance with an abstract written or pictorial description in a deed or 
map reflects the true boundary depends a great deal on the individual who actually marks the physical boundary on the land. Even if 
this task is performed by a surveyor, both courts and experts in the field acknowledge that the resulting physical boundary may not 
accurately reflect the true boundary. 
Surveying is a profession that depends to a great extent on the skill of the surveyor. (Robillard, Clark on Surveying and Boundaries 
(6th ed. 1992) p. 23; Brown, Boundary Control and Legal Principles (3d ed. 1986) p. 1.) To perform a legally reliable survey, the 
surveyor must be skilled in "the science of land measurements, ... the laws and customs that define the boundaries of real property, 
and ... the art of evaluating the evidence needed to prove the location of a boundary." (Brown, Boundary Control and Legal Principles, 
op. cit. supra, at p. 1; see Killian v. Hill (1990) 32 Ark.App. 25 T795 S.W.2d 369, 3701 ["Surveying has been described both as an art 
... and as a science, ..."].) The surveyor's task is particularly difficult if important landmarks or comer monuments have been "lost" or 
"obliterated" with the passage of time. (See Maolesden v. United States (9th Cir. 1985) 764 F.2d 1290. 1291-1292 [noting the 
distinction between "lost" and "obliterated" comer markers and illustrating the difficulties posed by each]; Vinyard v. Vauaht (1985) 
138 Ill.App.3d 641 T92 IH.Dec. 888, 485 N.E.2d 11311 [illustrating difficulty of procedures for reestablishing obliterated comers]; 
Mil/iaan v. Mil/iaan (Me. 1993) 624 A.2d 474 [although deed was not ambiguous, surveys conflicted because of missing monument]; 
Robillard, Clark on Surveying and Boundaries, op. cit. supra, at pp. 490-578 [discussing at length the complex techniques used to 
locate missing landmarks and corner monuments]; Brown, Boundary Control and Legal Principles, op. cit. supra, at p. 372 [ to locate 
lost monuments a surveyor may need to "interview[] [ * *1045] [ * * * 9 7 ] former landowners or parties who have ... knowledge [of 
the location of the landmarks], interview[] other surveyors, orexanin[e] public records"].) 
Even if the surveyor is diligent, he may nevertheless fail to find the correct location of a landmark or comer. (See Afbrecht v. U.S. 
(10th Cir. 1987) 831 F.2d 196, 199 [sufficient evidence to support finding that surveyor incorrectly marked "meander corners" and 
"meander lines"]; Hansen v. Stewart (Utah 1988) 761 P.2d 14, 18-21 (dis. opn. of Howe, Associate C. J.) [illustrating the complexity 
and uncertainty of the techniques used to locate comers].) For example, one expert cites an instance in which 12 different surveyors 
located a comer at a particular spot, and only after the 13th surveyor used a metal detector to locate the original comer monument 
[ *64] was it discovered that the comer was in fact some 70 feet away. (Brown, Boundary Control and Legal Principles, op. cit. 
supra, at p. 372.) According to this commentator, such incidents have occurred in every state. (Ibid.) In addition, as we have noted, 
the exact physical locations of a boundary may be uncertain even if the true locations of the landmarks and comers are known. (See 
Young v. Blakeman. supra. 153 Cal. 477, 480-481 [When boundary is located a specific distance from a fixed object, "Experience 
shows that ... measurements [of that distance], made at various times by different persons with different instruments, will usually 
vary somewhat... If the position of the line always remain[s] to be ascertained by measurement alone, the result [is] that it [is not] a 
fixed boundary, but [is] subject to change with every new measurement. Such uncertainty and instability in the title to land [is] 
intolerable."].) 
In light of the complexity of the rules of surveying, the skill necessary to apply them correctly, and the possibility that different 
surveyors will reach different conclusions about the location of a boundary even if there is a precise description of its location in a 
deed or map, it is impractical to disregard adjacent landowners' long-standing agreements regarding the physical location of the 
boundary merely because such a document is available. Also, if the boundaries set by surveyors were to be given priority over those 
agreed to by the landowners, courts and perhaps juries could often be compelled to determine which of two or more conflicting 
surveys was the most accurate. Both courts and juries have been forced to settle such disputes in the past, and experience reveals 
it is no easy task- (See, e.g., Finlev v. Yuba County Water Dist.. supra. 99 Cal.App.3d 691, 695: Link v. Cole Investment Co. (1962) 
199 Cal.App.2d 180, 182 Q8 Cal.Rptr. 4411: Hansen v. Stewart, supra. 761 P.2d 14, 15 [jury trial devoted solely to identifying the 
physical location of a single comer].) 
II 
The majority state that their holding is meant to "reaffirm the vitality" (maj. opn., ante, p. 54) of our holding in Ernie, supra. 51 Cal.2d 
702, 707, that a party asserting an agreed boundary must prove that there was "[1] an uncertainty as to the true boundary line, [2] 
an agreement between the coterminous owners fixing the line, and [3] acceptance and acquiescence in the line so fixed for a period 
equal to the statute of limitations or under such circumstances that substantial loss would be caused by a change of its position." 
Curiously, however, the majority do so by limiting the application of our statement in Ernie that 'The court may infer that there was 
an agreement between the coterminous owners ensuing from uncertainty or a dispute, from the long-standing acceptance of a fence 
as a boundary between [ *65] their lands." (Ernie, supra. 51 Cal.2d 702, 708: see also Hello v. Weaver, supra. 36 Cal.2d 456, 460: 
Hannah v. Poaue. supra. 23 Cal.2d 849, 856 [citing earlier cases].) 
I too would reaffirm our holding in Ernie; however, I would reaffirm it in its entirety, including the inferences of uncertainty and 
eement. These inferences were sound when we announced our decision in Ernie in 1959, and they remain sound to this day, 
2ther or not a legal description is available. When an individual erects a physical barrier in approximately the same location as the 
indary between his property and that [ * *1046 ] [ * * * 9 8 ] of his neighbor, one of three matters is likely to occur. First, the 
acent landowner may determine that the physical barrier is actually on his own property. Second, the adjacent landowner may 
>neously believe that the physical barrier accurately represents the true boundary between the two parcels. Third, the adjacent 
jowner may not be sure where the true boundary is, but may believe that it is in approximately the same place as the physical 
tier. 
:he first scenario, the adjacent landowner would almost certainly demand that the barrier be removed; therefore, there would be 
acquiescence. In the second and third scenarios, the adjacent landowner probably would allow the physical barrier to remain; 
refore, there would be acquiescence. Accordingly, if there has been long-term acquiescence in the presence of a physical barrier, 
; reasonable to infer that, at the time it was built, either the second or third scenario occurred. Under either the second or third 
snario, there is sufficient uncertainty regarding the true physical location of the boundary to satisfy the first element of Ernie. (See 
;bickel v. Stevens Ranch Co. (1921) 187 Cal. 15. 19 f200 P. 6511 (Nusbickel) ['The word 'uncertainty*... conveyfs] the idea that at 
time of the location of the division line neither of the coterminous owners knew the true position of the line on the ground" and 
requirement is satisfied if the landowners believe they know where the physical boundary is but are mistaken.]; Kunza v. Gaskell 
79) 91 Cal.App.3d 201, 209 T154 Cal.Rptr. 1011 ["it has been consistently held that a 'dispute or controversy is not essential' to 
required 'uncertainty' " ] ; see also Ernie, supra, 51 Cal.2d 702, 708 ['The line may be founded on a mistake."], citing Nusbickel. 
)ra. 187 Cal. 15, 19.) 
lilarly, in the first scenario there would be no express or implied agreement between the landowners that the physical barrier 
resented the true physical boundary between the parcels, and the second element of Ernie would not be satisfied. However, if the 
:ond and third scenarios occur and the adjacent landowner allows the physical barrier to remain, it is reasonable to infer that he 
j agreed, either expressly or impliedly, that it represents [ *66] the true boundary, thereby satisfying the second element of Ernie. 
\e Kraemer v. Superior Oil Co. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 642, 651 T49 Cal.Rptr. 8691 ["It is not necessary that the agreement 
ween the parties be an express one. It may be inferred or implied from their conduct, ..."].) 
course, the evidentiary force of these inferences will vary depending on the facts of each case. For example, they would be 
itled to less weight if the physical barrier was a substantial distance from the true boundary given the size of the parcels. They 
y also be entitled to less weight if there is evidence that the physical barrier was built for some purpose other than to mark a 
jndary. (See maj. opn., ante, p. 59 [suggesting that a physical barrier may be erected for "aesthetics, the control of livestock, and 
s need to constrain young children from wandering too far from a residence," and its location may be influenced by "the suitability of 
i terrain to accept the fence, the presence of nearby landscaping, the skill of the builder, and even the subsequent movement of 
\ fence through disrepair, pressure exerted by livestock, or loss of lateral or subjacent support"].) Finally, these inferences may be 
s persuasive if the material used to build the physical barrier is not of a type likely to be used to mark a boundary. However, unless 
sre is contrary evidence sufficient to outweigh the evidentiary force of these inferences, they must prevail. 
2 majority suggest that an "expansive interpretation of the agreed-boundary doctrine ... clearly would add unnecessary expense 
J stress to the prospect of real property ownership in California .... [and would] encourage coterminous landowners to resolve their 
putes ... by erecting imperfect barriers, 'drawing lines in the sand,' or hauling neighbors into court, [and not] by resorting to title 
arches, deed descriptions, and other objectively certain methods that afford the parties a superior opportunity to reach amicable, 
ilitigious resolution of their disputes." (Maj. [ * * * 9 9 ] [ * *1047] opn., ante, p. 60) The majority also conclude that such an 
srpretation would "tacitly encourage[] a lack of due diligence on the part of property owners by tempting them not to consult legal 
scriptions in an effort to reach amicable resolution of their disputes, and instead [would] induce[] property owners to resort to the 
jrts to resolve their boundary disputes." (Maj. opn., anre, p. 60, italics in original.) 
o not believe that the reading of Ernie proposed in part I I of this dissent would produce the results described by the majority. If a 
pute arises between adjacent landowners regarding the location of their common boundary, they could take one of two steps. 
; t , as the majority seem to suggest, [ *67] they could hire a surveyor--or, more likely, each could hire his own surveyor--to 
:ermine the "true" location of the boundary based on the descriptions in their respective deeds. If the surveyors agree on the 
ation of the boundary, the dispute would be resolved. As discussed in part I of this dissent, however, each surveyor may reach a 
:erent conclusion and neither survey may be accurate. The landowners would then either have to litigate the matter—in which case 
»y would incur substantial legal expenses and the courts would be required to determine which survey is accurate—or reach a 
tlement, which the landowners could have done in the first place. In either case, the landowners would have incurred the expense 
hiring a surveyor to locate the true physical boundary. 
:ond, the landowners could simply agree to build some physical barrier in a location that reflects a compromise between their 
pective understandings regarding the physical location of the true boundary. A broad reading of the Ernie requirements facilitates 
:h informal dispute resolution by ensuring that the landowners' agreement will be given legal effect even though there is no direct 
dence that a dispute and settlement occurred. Under such a rule, the landowners would incur only the expense of building the 
/sical barrier, which may serve a variety of other useful purposes, and would not be forced to incur the additional expense—in the 
m of legal costs—of making a record of their dispute and agreement so that they or their successors in interest could sustain their 
'den of proof in court many years in the future. In addition, the landowners' successors in interest would not suffer prejudice 
:ause, even without documentation of the dispute and resolution, the presence of a physical barrier would put them on notice of 
j location of the agreed boundary. 
" from encouraging a "lack of due diligence" or a resort to 'frontier justice," the second approach, which the broader reading of 
lie facilitates, thus allows adjacent landowners to resolve their disputes easily without resort to attorneys, to surveyors, or to the 
j r ts , and ensures that their mutual understanding regarding the location of their boundary, as evidenced by their long-term 
quiescence in a physical barrier, will be respected and given legal effect. 
this case, it is undisputed that the physical barrier between plaintiffs' and defendants' oropertv stood in the same location for manv 
ycdib in excess or me appncaoie statute of limitations, thereby satisfying Ernie's long-term acquiescence requirement. It was 
therefore reasonable to infer the two remaining Ernie requirements--uncertainty and agreement. Notwithstanding [*68] any contrary 
evidence in the record, the inference of agreement and uncertainty arising from the parties' long-term acquiescence is sufficient to 
support the judgment. (See Hannah v. Pooue, supra, 23 Cal.2d 849, 856-857 [inference of agreement and uncertainty arising from 
long-term acquiescence sufficient to support judgment]; see generally, Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 ("45 
P.2d 1831.) 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
Kennard, J., concurred. 
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